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:
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James A. Thompson, B.A., Oakland University, M.A., University
of Massachusetts (Amherst)

Directed by Drs. Gerhard Braunthal and Howard Wiarda.
This essay is an attempt to further the development of

general explanations in the political and social dimension
of life by focusing upon

a

iety—the political party.

central component of modern socThis task is assumed to be worth-

while and is held to be possible, 'because men seek to explain the world around them, and because explanations of
social phenomena are neither totally normative, nor empirical

but exhibit

a

gradual shifting of emphasis from what ought

to be to what is.

This shift is facilitated by the con-

struction of analytical frameworks which advance empirical

theory development because of their utility in independent

variable recognition and classification.
It is our contention that the three broadest attempts

to explain the phenomenon political party, the Marxian
theory, the democratic responsible-party explanation, and

the taxonomies of Maurice Duverger are each a step toward

eventual general party theory.

However, each of these ex-

planations contains serious weaknesses of orientation, inclusiveness, range and level of conceptualization.

The

.

Marxian and responsible-party explanations are mutually exclusive and of high normative content.

The Marxian explan-

ation is general while the responsible-party or mandate

theory is of the middle range.

Both exhibit inconsistencies

of conceptualization.

The "preliminary general theory of parties" of Maurice

Duverger is clearly empirical and

is

inclusive of both the

Marxian and mandate party explanations but

is of little use

in explaining the parties and party systems of the Third

World.

He gives us a conceptualization of parties primarily

as collectivities of individuals rather than patterned human

interactions producing consequences.

As a result, his class-

ification schema are static rather than dynamic.

They are

useful in development of a general party theory but as

Duverger himself modestly claims, only

a

preliminary step

in this direction.

The epistemological bases of the three explanations of
parties are analyzed from a positivist
spective.

— subjectivist

per-

It is our position that general explanations of

human phenomena must be cognizant of both epistemological
traditions.

Both Marx and Duverger largely ignore subjec-

tivism but for different reasons while Woodrow Wilson, as

representative of the mandate party explanation,
ambiguous

is

quite

a

A suggested heuristic bridge between traditions
development of a model which

is the

based upon commonalities of

is

function of all manifestations of the phenomenon party.

This

search for shared functions, if successful, then allows us
to search for common variables and to trace out the inter-

play of these variables upon parties and party systems.
The functional bridge appropriate for our task is the

dynamic model of social stratification of Gerhard Lenski in

which he utilizes the concepts of both class and class sysLenski suggests that any society consists of dominant

tem.

and subservient class systems, each of which is comprised
of different classes.
a

Every member of any society is both

member of all class systems and also

or power class within that system.

a

member of a class

This class membership

and the ranking of the class systems determines the allocation
of societal rewards of power, privilege and prestige.
It is our contention that political parties are the re-

sult of struggles for dominance in the allocation processes

of a society and that these struggles are of three major
types,
(3)

(1)

between class systems,

(2)

between class systems and classes.

between classes, and
Viewed from this

perspective, the static approach to party explanation of

Duverger is supplemented with

a

dynamic element of social

struggle over the distribution of rewards.

Political parties

are prime actors in these struggles in contemporary societies.

From this perspective, new variables concerning many dimensions of party and party system organization and activity

patterns can be isolated.

This essay is presented as a

beginning in this direction.

iii

PREFACE

The original motivation for this study evolved from my

dissatisfaction with the mutually exclusive nature of the
"democratic" and "communist" explanations of political
parties.

This situation became apparent to me during my

graduate student study at Amherst.

I

explored the limita-

tions of these explanations of political parties in a

master's thesis which in turn led to the present study.
It is my belief that empirically based explanations of

social science phenomena are possible and will eventually
be generated when the process of variable recognition is

more developed than at present.

But this endeavor must be

guarded by a theoretical framework which both structures
the search and points the way to fruitful avenues of ex-

ploration.

This essay is an attempt to move forward in the

accomplishment of the second objective.

The static tax-

onomies of political parties provided by Maurice Duverger
are supplemented by the dynamic insights into social evol-

ution of Gerhard Lenski

— insights

resulting from his focus

upon the social division of societal rewards.
I

feel a deep sense of appreciation toward Professors

Glen Gordon and Philip Coulter whose graduate seminar in

Political Sociology at the University of Massachusetts

developed in me an appreciation of the possibilities
of
using sociological variables to explain political phenomena.
Professors Gerard Braunthal and. Howard .Wiarda have patiently

sustained my efforts over the years to complete this -study.

Their suggestions have proved of great value to a student
who, in the beginning,

failed to appreciate the magnitude

of his chosen task.

When ideas do not emerge, scholars can become shorttempered and morose.
little complaint.

My wife Norma has borne this with

In addition, daughters Sharon and

Michelle have refrained from sarcastic remarks as
at the ceiling.

I

stared

For these and other supports and motiva-

tions such as "When are you going to finish that thing?,
I

offer sincere thanks to all.
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CHAPTER

I

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXPLANATION

Introduction

The primary purpose of this study is to advance our

understanding of one of the central components of political
life, the political party.

Some voices are now being raised

concerning a possible excess of emphasis with regard to the
direct attention which this aspect of political life has been
attracting.

It is our contention that parties are an inte-

gral part of government and politics in post-primitive societies and are thus a necessary subject of continued study if

Political Science is to move toward more general explanations
of the political aspects of man in society.

We are herein

attempting to advance the discipline two steps further toward
the eventual goal of a general empirical theory of parties.

The first step consists of an analysis and critique of the

work of contemporary general party theorists, and the second
step is a suggested means whereby we might begin to surmount
some of the methodological problems of party studies stated by

"Political Parties in Western Democracies:
Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity Vol. #2, (Winter, 1969),
pp. 111-114.
-'"Anthony King,

,

1

2

such students of modern parties as Maurice Duverger 2 and

Sigmund Neumann.

3

Explanation and understanding in political science, like

understanding and explanation in any field of inquiry,
cumulative enterprise.

is a

The development of a general theory

of parties must build upon prior relevant work.

We will

examine the three explanations which have the most valid claim
to be regarded as general explanations of political parties.

Methodological standards of assessment to appraise these explanations will be developed and applied to the "mandate,
responsible-government,

"

and the "Marxian-Communist,

"

and the

Duverger party explanatory frameworks
The second or methodological problem has been well outlined by both Duverger and Neumann.

Duverger states:

find ourselves in a vicious circle:

a general theory of

"We

parties will eventually be constructed only upon preliminary

work of many profound studies; but these studies cannot be
truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of

parties."^

Neumann assesses the problem in similar terms when

2

Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization
and Activity in the Modern State trans, by Barbara and Robert
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p. xiii.
North, (New York:
,

3

Sigmund Neumann, ed., "Why Study Political Parties,"
Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparat ive Politics,
University of Chicago Press, 1956).
(Chicago:
4

Duverger, p.

xm.
.

•

•

he states
I

The question of a proper approach to a meaningful theory of political party structure poses a
dilemma because the overwhelming data of our material world fall into a conceivable pattern only
if seen through the controlled order of a conceptual framework, which in turn can be conceived only
in a full appreciation of the rich texture of
reality. The task of attempting to systematize
our knowledge therefore, is confronted by almost
overwhelming difficulties and can proceed only by
a simultaneous attack on both theory and practice. 5
This essay suggests an escape route from the "vicious circle"
of Duverger by presenting a heuristic model as one means of

surmounting the pitfalls inherent in reliance upon either
ideographic and descriptive case studies or the logico-

deductive mode of explanation in the Social Sciences, a mode
upon which Duverger relies and which he, and others, defend
as being appropriate to the present stage of development of

Social Science explanation.
The ultimate goal in inquiry, both in natural and social
science, is explanation.

It is our contention that, because

of the nature of the subject matter of social science, complex

social man, exclusive reliance upon the deductive approach to

party explanation at the present stage of our knowledge of the
In a more recent discussion of the
Neumann, p. 4.
search for a general party theory, Lawrence C. Mayer is perhaps less optimistic than Neumann. See his Comparative PolHomewood 111.:
itical Inquiry: A Methodological Survey
for a Theory
Search
"The
The Dorsey Press, 1972), Chapter 11,
5

,

of Parties

.

(

,

4

phenomenon will inhibit our search for empirical theory.

We

do not plead a case for normative theory, but rather suggest

and describe a middle course approach, that of analytical

modeling as a means to carry us toward our eventual goal of

a

general empirical theory of political parties.
Basic Questions and Assumptions

The basic questions to be explored are:

itical parties?

Why study pol-

What are the limitations of various current

approaches to a general explanation of parties?

What diffi-

culties does the social scientist encounter is attempting to

develop an empirical general theory of parties?

What are the

alternatives available to enable the researcher to surmount
these apparent limitations?
The first of these questions will be dealt with below and

those remaining will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

Parties will be presented as a central component of modern

society

—a

resultant of the mass participation ethos which has

been developing for the past two centuries

— ever

since revol-

utionary France of 1789 institutionalized the "democratic"
idea of popular, legitimate influence upon the ruling strata
of nation-states.

The inherent explanatory limitations of present approaches
to an understanding of parties will be presented within an

analytical framework of critique which emphasizes the implicit
values of the individual theorist, or, in the case of Duverger,
the lack of sufficient empirical rigor in what he presents as
his most valid generalization.
In order to develop a valid deductive theory it is nec-

essary to recognize and give valid weight of influence to all

variables seen as shaping in any way the dependent variable

which we are attempting to explain and understand.

Thus, the

use of this methodological approach in the study of parties
an approach which is presently advocated by many philosophers
of science, ^ is premature in the study of the phenomenon pol-

itical party.

We are not yet able to recognize many of the

independent variables much less quantify them.

Our approach

to party explanation is to utilize a method which we believe

will not only break out of the "vicious circle" of Duverger,

but will also help to overcome the problem of relevant variable recognition which inhibits the fully effective utili-

zation of the logico-deductive mode of explanation as applied
to the study of parties.

We will suggest that one way to circumvent the problems
of method in the study of parties is to utilize a functionally

6

See,

Discovery

,

Scientific
for example, Karl R. Popper, The Logic of
1961).
Wiley, Science Editions,
(New York:

6

based heuristic model.

This device should allow us to by-

pass the inherent difficulties in both
the narrow deductive

heuristic such as that employed by Anthony Downs, 7
and the
explanations of a general but value-laden type such as
those

employed by Karl Marx and the "mandate" party theorists.

A basic assumption of this approach to party theory is
that most, if not all parties share certain functional char-

acteristics and that by emphasizing these functions by means
of a heuristic model and then their psychological and socio-

logical functions, conceptualization of similarities in

independent and intervening variables might be fruitful.

These concepts should then point to more hidden variables

which have heretofore been neglected and ignored.

A clarification regarding our use of the ambiguous words
"function" and "functional" is necessary if we are to avoid
the sort of criticism leveled by Robert E. Dowse 8 against

one of the leading proponents of the functionalist mode of
7

'Anthony Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy
York: Harper and Row, 1957)
,

p

"A Functionalist's Logic," World Politics

,

,

(New

(July,

1966),

A similar criticism is also developed by Eugene
pp.
A Critical
J. Meehan in Contemporary Political Thought:
The
Dorsey
Press,
(Homewood, Illinois:
Study
1967), p. 176.
607-622.
,

7

explanation, Gabriel A. Almond. 9

Dowse alleges that Almond

gives us a universal generalization regarding the seven

functions which all political systems perform but he does not

attempt to define his' use of the 'term function so that:
If the basic concept is not defined, it follows
that there is no conceptual limitation upon the proliferation of categories: the classes of activity
ascribed to the political system are not derived from
a basic conceptual or propos itional framework. . .
There is no reason why the number of functions suggested for the political system should not have run

into hundreds, witj^ only nomenclatural infertility
imposing a limit.

Ernest Nagel
a list to

11

has delineated six usages of the term function,

which Meehan has added a seventh possibility. 12

Some of these usages appear to emphasize overly fine distinctions but two of them, in the realm of social science inquiry,

We refer to the use of func-

require clear differentiation.
tion to imply either
or

(b)

(a)

a necessity for systemic maintenance,

the agent producing certain consequences.

Following

Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative
Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.),
Princeton
(Princeton:
The Politics of the Developing Areas
University Press, 1960).
9 Gabriel A.

,

10 Dowse, World Politics

,

pp.

608-609.

^Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science:
(New York:
Logic of Scientific Explanation
520-535.
& World Inc., 1961), pp.
,

12 Meehan,
13 King,

p.

pp.

113.

118-119.

Problems in the
Harcourt, Brace

8

the lead of King we will adhere to the second usage, not
only

because it has the analytical flexibility of allowing for

both intended and unintended consequences, but also because
this latter usage avoids the technological connotations in-

herent in viewing functions as indispensable components of
the system chosen for study.

The Study of Political Parties

Why study political parties?
this question is:

The most obvious answer to

Because parties exist!

The modern world

contains social entities to which conventional wisdom assigns
the label of political party and with the positive value which
is

commonly attached to the concept "democratic," parties are

regarded as a vehicle by which this desired condition can be
realized.

With certain ideological differences to be discussed

below, this state of affairs is as valid for one-party as for

two- and multi-party politics.

If it is the task of the stu-

dent of government and politics to describe and explain pol-

itical realities, then such a widespread phenomenon cannot be
ignored.

Some contemporary scholars are prone to list specific

reasons why the study of parties should be continued and expanded.

Some appear to suggest that one of the primary jus-

tifications for studying parties

is

because of the rise of a

competing ideology to democracy as we know it in the West

an ideology which until very recently has been regarded as

generating a one-party monolith. 14
suggested by both Neumann 15 and

Such a justification is

Nei-l A.

McDonald

the primary reasons for the study of parties.

16

as one of

.

Neumann addi-

tionally justifies his work by claiming that "political
parties are the lifeline of modern politics," 17 and that
"Political Parties are the main agents of public affairs." 18

Attitudes such as these have been brought into serious question by both Anthony King and Howard A. Scarrow

1Q

who suggest

that the role in government and political processes which is

commonly assigned to parties may, in fact, be exaggerated

because of scholarly assumptions rather than empirical investigation.

If the wish is father to the thought,

explanation cannot be delivered from

a

empirical

union of fervent desires

14 For exceptions to these attitudes see the discussion of
the Polish "hegemonic party system" by Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland, " American Political Science Review Vol. LXIV,
,

(December,

No. 4,
15

1970), pp. 1239-1245.

Neumann, pp. 1-2,

5.

16

Neil A. McDonald, The Study of Political Parties
Random House, 1955), p. 4.
York:
17

18

Neumann, p.
Ibid.

,

p.

,

(New

1.

4.

19

See King, Polity and Howard A. Scarrow, "The Function
Literature and the
of Political Parties: A Critique of the
Approach," Journal of Politics No. 29, (November, 1967), pp.
772-774.
,

,

10

and isolated rationally.

it is our contention that excess-

ively normative and/or rational studies of parties do little
to further explanation of them.

Why then should one engage in the empirical study of
political parties?

If this question is adequately answered,

another is then generated:

How should parties be studied?

The answer to the first question is that a social

phenomenon called parties exists and that the furtherance of
comprehension of the political aspect of human social life
requires that parties be understood

— not

in the normative

context of superior and inferior political ideologies and
systems, but from the point of view of value neutral under-

standing.

Our position concerning party studies has no

ethical overburden.

It is justified instead on the grounds

of man's apparent desire to empirically explain as much as

he can of the world around him.

In striving for under-

standing of political life, parties are permanent appearing
social institutions, at least in the short run, and thus can

be considered one of the relevant variables which must be
recognized, studied, and perhaps eventually fully understood,

How then should the study of the phenomenon political
party be approached?

Duverger has summarized a central

"basic
problem of the study of parties when he refers to the

consists,
contradiction" inherent in a field of study which

for the most part, of single polity description and analysis.

Such a narrow gauge approach does not encourage the formulation and testing of general hypotheses applicable to a

cross-polity general party investigation.

But,

such general

questions can only be generated in a meaningful way by the
use of a theoretical framework.

Thus the question then be-

Why theories about political parties?"

comes:

All political communities which have reached the socially
differentiated stage of political development contain two
primary political classes, the rulers and the ruled.

This

division of responsibility raises questions concerning:
the fundamental roles of rulers (politicians)
and their recruitment and selection, the personal,
social and organizational basis of their influence,
and how their political organizations ^.f feet the
making of important public decisions.
.

.

.

The political party has been called a link between the governors and the governed:
The political party is a strategically critical
concept for understanding, in any developed political
system, the practices that permit and justify the
exercise of political authority, that regulate the
effective choice and removal of political rulers, and
20 This question has been explored by Avery Leiserson in
"The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," American
Political Science Review Vol. 51, No. 4, (December, 1957),
,

pp. 947-950.
21 Ibid.

,

p.

947.

that prescribe and delimit the authority of the
government in power; as well as the processes by
which public policy-makers are guided by and subject to the broad movements of popular sentiment
and the balance of inter-group pressures.

There is a wealth of data available which describes the

characteristics of individual parties and party systems.

A

theoretical approach to the study of parties can describe
interrelationships among parties and organize and clarify the

available information in order to increase comprehension and

possibly predictability.

Political Groups in Society

Entities referred to as political groups are a part of
all differentiated societies.

Decision makers, and groups

seeking to influence, control, and often displace them, have

existed since the beginning of recorded history.
of,

Observation

comment upon, and analysis of the processes whereby pol-

itical power is attained,

influenced and controlled, has

continued for at least the past 2,500 years.

23

Until almost the present century, the study of political
groups in society has consisted of a stated or implied
22

Ibid.

,

p.

948.

such obserThe Politics of Aristotle is an example of
trans, by Ernest
vation and analysis. See especially Book V,
Press, 1962).
Baker, (New York: Oxford University
23

13

measurement of the observed actuality against
ative ideal type of political organization.

a

highly norm-

Observers often

posited a particular end for man in political society to
attain.

Groups and/or group systems would then be discussed

in terms of how they contributed to the attainment of a par-

ticular polity, or how they fell short of the posited ideal. 24

Following the development of

a specific

phenomenon referred

to as party, analytical studies of these entities began to

appear

Analytical Party Studies

The first steps in the direction of an analytical ap-

proach to the cross-polity study of parties was the turn-of-

the-century work of Roberto Michels^ and Michael Ostrogorski.
One scholar states that prior to the attempt of Maurice
nA

For example, many Medieval philosophers strongly criticized any group in society seen as circumscribing the functioning of the Church in many, if not all aspects of civil
society.
25

Roberto Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study
of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy trans, by
Eden and Cedar Paul, (New York: The Free Press, 1966; originally published 1915)
,

26Michael Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organi zation of
Political Parties edited and abridged by Seymour Martin
Lipset, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964;
first published 1902)
,

14

Duverger to construct a general theory of political parties
in the early 1950 's,

"...

only Ostrogorski and Michels had

written analytical stasiology

1,27

This is an overstatement

unless it is not intended to refer to the analytical study
of parties and party systems in specific polities such as the

work of V. 0. Key and Elmer E. Schattschneider in the United
States, or G. D. H. Cole and R. T. McKenzie in Britain.

These

scholars are representative of observers who looked behind and

beyond the formal and legal structure of governments to seek
answers to such questions as:

operate?

How does government really

Their inquiries were not of a broad and inclusive

scope to the degree that they might be called general party

theorists but they, and many others in the past fifty years,
have amassed a vast body of empirical data concerning specific

parties and party systems, leading one observer to note that
there is "an embarrassment of riches" which awaits the general

party theorist.

28

Both Michels and Ostrogorski directed their attention

toward a comparison of formal and actual power structures of the
27

Frederick C. Englemann, "A Critique of Recent Writings
on Political Parties," The Journal of Politics Vol. 19, No.
(1957)
pp. 423-440.
,

,

28 McDonald, p.

3.

3,

15

democratic aspect of parties and found a wide divergence
between democratic theory and actual practice.

One current

observer has stated that both of these analysts attempted to

move from the particular to the general by examination of
specific systems, and from this examination to move in the

direction of general laws or generalizations. 29

This approach

was confined to few parties and party systems and only to

those of an alleged democratic leaning.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the only crosspolity general theoretical frameworks developed were what will

here be called the "mandate" theory and the Marxian theory of
parties

Nearly half a century later, Maurice Duverger, in his

groundbreaking work,

30

sought to enlarge the scope of the

analytical study of parties by inclusion of both democratic
and authoritarian parties within the same explanatory frame-

work

.

Our field of interest in this essay is in furthering the

efforts to develop a general empirical party theory and we

will suggest a framework of analysis with which the mandate,

Marxian and Duverger contributions to such a theory can be
assessed.
29 Englemann, The Journal of Politics
30

Duverger, Political Parties:
Activity in the Modern State.

.

Their Or ganization and

16

An Analytical Framework of Critique
In order to effectively judge the contribution made to

the understanding of the phenomenon political party by existing

theoretical constructs, it is necessary to devise an analytical
framework.

This tool of analysis will then allow us to assess

the value of these offerings to determine their validity as

general empirical theories of parties.
The criteria used as a standard of judgment in this

essay are:

(1)

the orientation or type of theory

foundation primarily normative or empirical?

(2)

— Is

its

the inclu-

siveness of specific manifestations of the relevant phenomenon
to be explained,

theory:
(4)

(3)

the range, scope, or reach of the proposed

Is it of narrow or middle range,

or a general theory?

the level of abstraction at which the entity called party,

by the theorist,

is

conceptualized.

Is the theorist's con-

ceptualization of party one step removed from the empirical
reality--the human actor

— or

is

it a distance of two con-

ceptual steps in that party is being conceived of as a patterned complex of human actions or behaviors?

These four

criteria are presented as valid means of evaluation to deter-

mine the utility of party theories as general tools of explanation.

17

Orientation or Theory Type

Our first standard of theory evaluation is the deter-

mination as to whether the emphasis of the theory

is

based

upon a foundation of normative value judgments or empirical
This is not to suggest that it is possible to conduct

facts.

political or any other research which is value-free.

very choice of phenomena to be explained
judgment.

is

The

in itself a value

But the influence of a value foundation:

does not mean, however, that the validity of
empirical research depends upon the kind of values
with which one approaches his data; validity still
is determined by the correspondence of a statement
to reality. 3
.

.

.

Normative (ethical or moral) and empirical (descriptive,

behavioral or operational) theories rest upon fundamentally
different bases.
express

"...

The former is based upon propositions which

the emotional response of an individual to a

state of real or presumed facts."

32

Such propositions usually

contain elements of both value and fact.
can be tested as to its validity

— the

The factual portion

value portion cannot be

"It indicates whether, and the extent to which,

so tested.

an individual desires a particular state of affairs to exist."
3l

3

David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959),
(New York:
State of Political Science
,

pp. 225-226.
32

lb id

33 Ibid.

,

p.

221.
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Empirical constructs have as their basis only real

We are continuously confronted with an uncountable

facts.

number of empirical facts— facts which are, or have been,

observed to exist as descriptions of properties which are
ascribed to realities.

"it is by experience alone that in-

formation about the world is received.

1,34

Thus an empirical

fact is independent of all other knowledge.

It is a "claim

to knowledge which is independent of, and not a derivative
from,

existing knowledge."

35

Political parties exist as

viable entities and vital components of the political systems
of most of the world.

To attempt to explain their factual

existence, structure and function,

in other than a frame of

reference which fully recognized the empirical aspect would

appear to this observer to be moving away from reality.

Theory Indus iveness

If a theory is to be a valid general tool of explanation

with reference to a particular phenomenon

(in this instance

political parties), then the theory must be broad enough to
include all those entities which should be included in the
34

Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry
The Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 4.

,

(San Francisco:

Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political
The Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 38.
(Homewood, Illinois:
Analysis
,
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nomenclature which has been chosen to establish
the characteristics and the boundaries of the phenomenon
under investigation.

If the specific manifestations of the
phenomenon

which are perceived by the investigator to exhaust the
relevant class of observables do not in fact do so, then
the

utility of the theory as a general explanatory construct
open to serious question.

is

This is especially true if the

excluded but relevant manifestations are later demonstrated
to exhibit characteristics which are at variance with the

basic assumptions which the observer made in the formulation
of his theory.

Thus inclusiveness of all relevant occurrences

of the phenomenon is a necessary attribute of a valid general

theory.

Theory Range

This proposed yardstick to measure the effectiveness of

theory as an explanatory device
of explanation.
as

is

concerned with the level

If theory in the broad sense can be defined

"any kind of generalization or proposition that asserts

that two or more things, activities or events covary under

specified conditions,"

36

then the theories which the general-

izations make possible can be classified as narrow, middle36David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p. 7.
(New York:

,
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range, or broad (general) theories, depending upon
the level

of explanation which each of these types of theory
provides.

A theory that is narrow in scope, according to Easton,
is one which is a statement "of observed uniformity between

two isolated and easily identified variables." 37

From

such,

a construct few generalizations are possible because of the

limited number of variables present in this type of con-

ceptual explanation.

verify empirically.

Such hypotheses are relatively easy to

When taken alone they do not lend them-

selves to extension to theories of a higher level.

This is

the task of middle-range theories such as Michels

"Iron Law

of Oligarchy."

'

This type of theory allows the observer to

transcend the limits of his observations

— to

generalize as

did Michels about all groups in society which are formed for

specific ends.

Michels did not feel it necessary to confine

himself to his own verification of direct observation.

Middle-

range theories are based upon a number of singular generalizations which are then brought together within a conceptual
framework.

The third level of theory is that of broad general the-

ories—conceptual frameworks in which are located the tools
37

The above evaluation and
Easton, The Political System
Easton'
s, pp. 55-59.
classification of theories follows
.

21

Of explanation for either all of the
phenomena which are seen
as the province of a particular academic
discipline, or one

of the primary components of a discipline
such as political

parties within the study of government and politics.

With

regard to parties, such a general empirical theory
would be

cognizant of party origin, structure, and function, 38 as
it
seeks to explain the concept political party.

Level of Theory Conceptualization

The goal of this essay is to contribute to an eventual

empirical theory of political parties.

We have suggested that

party is an empirical entity which can be perceived, analyzed
and eventually explained within a general theoretical frame-

Any theoretical explanation is only as strong as the

work.

explanatory power of the concepts which the theory employs.
If is often held that the maturity of science
reflected in the status of its theory. Given
the fact that theoretical development is contingent
upon conceptual definition, the significance of
is

38

At least one observer, Neil A. McDonald in The Study of
Political Parties suggests that in addition to these aspects,
the legal status and the "object," the entity upon which the
party acts, are also "theoretical approaches" to the study of
party.
He has not convinced this observer that these two
aspects of the study of parties are necessary components of a
general empirical theory of parties since no two legal systems
are alike and all are normatively based and ideographic.
,
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conceptual definition is obvious for the growth of
the behavioral sciences. 39
Thus, any suggested theoretical explanation should be scru-

tinized as to the nature of the conceptualizations which it
employs

Concepts are not in themselves empirical but rather

the^

are the individual observer's imposition of intellectual

order upon the raw sense data to which the researcher's

attention is directed. 40

They imply a value judgment on the

part of the observer and a trained observer has an increased

chance of peer acceptability of concepts which he employs.
However, the act of peer acceptability of concepts within a

theoretical framework suggests the emphasis upon specific
values
Concepts specify the form and content of the variables
which one's general sociological orientation defines
as important.

Gordon J. Direnzo, "Conceptual Definition in the Behavioral Sciences," in Gordon J. Direnzo, ed., Concepts, Theory
(New York:
Random
and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences
House Inc., 1966), p. 16.
,

40

for example, Arthur S. Goldberg, "Political Science
as Science," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul
An Introducion to
A. Smith, eds., Politics and Social Life:
Mifflin
Co., 1963),
Houghton
(Boston:
Political Behavior
pp. 26-35.
See,

,

41 Alex Inkeles, What is Sociology? An Introduction to the
Prentice
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Discipline and Profession
Hall Inc.
1964)
p. 100.
,

,

,
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I

This orientation is a result of choice on the part
of the

observer and as such is an expression of a value
preference.
It is therefore impossible to totally divorce
fact from value
in explanation.

Thus, a wholly acceptable explanation of a

social science phenomenon is a function of its expression
of

widely held peer values within

a

historical context. 42

We

will thus assess the three general explanations of parties
from the perspective of the contemporary values of society

which they express or imply.
Another question with regard to conceptualizations is
the basic unit chosen as the dependent variable for which the

theory is intended to provide an explanation.

If the theory

is an attempt to explain the phenomenon political party;

Is party shown by the definition used by the observer,

intermediate or a high level abstraction?

level,

a

As King

low
43

has demonstrated, the level of conceptual abstraction utilized

by the theorist has important implications for the nature of
the questions which the theory is designed to provide answers.
If party is conceived as a cluster of human actors, then the

explanatory emphasis of the theoretical construct
upon party ideology, structure and organizations.
49

is

focused

If party

See Eugene J. Meehan, Value Judgment and Social Science
The Dorsey
(Homewood, Illinois:
Structures and Processes
Press, 1969), especially Chapters II and III.
,

4

^King, pp.

113-116.
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I

is conceived as patterned human
interactions,

then the em-

phasis of the explanation shifts to a stressing
of the:

—

consequences of parties and party systems
their existence, structure and behavior— for
political systems as a whole.
.

.

.

If parties are a central component of modern
government

and politics, we would expect that valid general explanations

would conceptualize parties in the second sense, as patterned
interactions

We shall analyze the three explanations of party to
determine both which dominant values, if any, they express and
also the level of abstraction at which the phenomenon political party is conceptualized.

Summary

We have presented four analytical standards with which
to determine the validity of an explanatory construct as

general empirical theory of parties.

a

If the proposed ex-

planation fails to meet the tests of orientation, of inclusiveness, of range, or of conceptualization, then its claim
to the status of a general empirical theory is invalid even

though it may qualify under one or two of our posited standards of validity.
44

I bid.

,

p.

115.

See also Scarrow, Journal of Politics
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Up to the present time, three explanations
of the phen-

omenon called political party have been developed
which have
some degree of legitimacy in their claim to be called
general

theories of parties.

Chapter II will briefly sketch the

essentials of two of these contructs

.

Chapter III will deal

in a similar manner with the Duverger approach to
general

party theory, as far as our analytical framework of theory
range, scope, base and conceptualization allows.

Chapter IV

will spell out some of the major difficulties inherent in
the subject matter with regard to theory construction in the

Social Sciences, and Chapter V will provide a definition of
party and additional discussion concerning the conceptualization
of this phenomenon.

Chapter VI will suggest some variables of

a

heuristic model as the path along which fruitful work toward

a

general empirical theory of political parties might proceed.

CHAPTER
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II

THE MANDATE -RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND MARXIANCOMMUNIST -MAO 1ST EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Prior to the "preliminary general theory of parties"

suggested by Maurice Duverger, the two most inclusive ex-

planations of parties were the Marxian-Communist, and the

mandate-responsible government theories.

The mandate theory

of parties was implied in the works of Woodrow Wilson, Henry

Jones Ford and Frank Goodnow,

1

and refined by Joseph

Schumpeter 2 and Elmer Schattschneider

3
.

It continues to

exercise considerable influence in the study of some aspects
of government.

The Marxian-Leninist-Maoist or communist

theoretical concept of party also enjoys extensive utilization
as a method of organization of the data concerning political

parties and as a tool of explanation.

The mandate or responsible government concept was developed by Wilson in Congressional Government
(Cleveland, Ohio:
World Publishing Co., 1964; originally published in 1885) and
in his Constitutional Government in the United States
(New
York:
Columbia University Press, 1908).
Henry Jones Ford's most explicit formulation of this explanation of the functioning of parties in mass democracy was
(New York: Machis The Rise and Growth of American Politics
The contribution of Frank J. Goodnow
millan Company, 1898)
developed in his Politics and Adminis
model
primarily
to the
(New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1900)
istration
,

,

,

.

,

Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Harper and Brothers, 2nd ed., 1947), see Chapters
(New York:
XXI and XXII.
,

o

»•»•*

(New
Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People
Government,
Party
and
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964),
York:
Farrar and Rinehart, 1942).
York:
(New
,
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The Mandate-Responsible Government Explanation of Party
This explanation of political parties has, for the past

one hundred years, continued to attract a great deal of sup-

port both from the general public and from students of government and politics.

It has been referred to both as the

"responsible government" explanation and also as the "mandate"

theory of parties.

Some observers have used these labels

interchangeably but the tendency has been to apply the label
"responsible" because of its implication of wider applicability
to specific manifestations of the phenomenon party than the

"mandate" designation has been felt to suggest.^

Political commentators have continued for centuries to

differ as to the essence of the concept democracy but a measure
of agreement is evident to the extent that democracy implies

some degree of ruler control by the ruled.

It is our con-

tention that the use of the words "mandate" and "responsible"
imply a subtle but important shift in emphasis concerning the

for example, Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller,
"Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion
"The notion
Quarterly Vol. 26 (Winter, 1962), pp. 531-546.
of responsibility generally is understood to mean that the
parties play a mediating role between the public and its government, making popular control effective by developing rival
programs of government action that are presented to the electorate for its choice. The party whose program gains the
greater support takes possession of the government and is held
responsible to the public in later elections for its success
p. 532.
in giving its program effect."
See,

,
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relationship between rulers and ruled with respect
to the
roles which these two societal elements are
assigned in the

democratic party explanations of the political aspects
of
society.

Most students of parties agree that party is the
institutional link between popular desires and governmental pol•

.

lcies.

5

The early observers of the phenomenon political

party, no doubt heavily influenced by assumptions of the

rationality and desire to participate in his own governance
on the part of the ruled, held that parties operating within
an electoral choice context were bound and constrained to

engage only in courses of action whose purpose was to effect
their pre-election promises.

These parties, in this early

view, were committed to narrow and specific programs, devia-

tion from which was sufficient justification for mass public

adverse reaction.

The reaction could vary from loss of elec-

toral support, to popular revolution.

6

This narrow view of

the scope of allowable party activity was a result of the

classical liberal position as to the proper role of government
in the affairs of the ruled.

Most authors of basic texts, as well as some more advanced and specialized commentators share this view. See, for
example Footnote #4, above.
John Locke and Thomas Jefferson are examples of democratic theorists who defended popular revolution as a check
upon those rulers who appeared to ignore the direct linkage
between the popular will and governmental policy outputs.

Both of these words continue to be used
in a highly normative context but it is our contention that
the label "mandate"
is the more normative of the two since
it has been applied to

a state or condition of political affairs
which could only

exist in a theoretical sense.

Since man has not, and will not

exist in a world of perfect information, it is not
reasonable
to expect that in any existing or anticipated representative

form of government, the rulers can have no flexibility what-

soever to exercise even a minimum degree of individual initiative.

The totally instructed delegate representative is

a

Utopian figment of the imagination of such political philosophers as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau.

The concept "responsible parties" suggests that there is
a degree of direct connection between electorate desires and

official public policy outputs but that this connection does
not restrict the choice of policy alternatives of rulers to

nearly the same degree as does the mandate designation.

Thus,

on a continuum of extent of governed control of the governors,

Wilson, Ford and Goodnow appear to fall within the middle

range of the mandated party

responsible party, scale.

Schumpeter and Schattschneider are much closer to the responsible party end of the continuum.
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The Party Responsibility Explanation of Political Party
This explanation of parties was initially developed by

three Americans around the turn of the century, Wilson, Ford
and Goodnow.

7

It has enjoyed continued use as an explanatory

framework for the phenomenon party; has been utilized by some

democratic theorists to "explain" some parties and party
systems, and has been justified by others as "the conduit or

sluice by which the waters of political machinery and set to
turn those wheels."

g

The mid-century work of a committee of

the foremost professional association of American Political

Science attests to its durability.

9

The model evolved as a result of the inquiries of these

men into such basic questions as the resolution of the conflict between majority rule and minority rights.

They util-

ized a theoretical approach to the study of the American party
7

As discussed by Austin Ranney in The Doctrine of ResThe University
(Urbana, Illinois:
ponsible Party Government
Chapter 6, the mandating or party
of Illinois Press, 1962).
was a party leader-member
Goodnow
Frank
responsibility of
relationship but like both Wilson and Ford, he was not at all
explicit in his definition of party membership.
,

8

Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government
Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 39.
9

,

(London:

"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American
Political Science Review, XLIV Supplement (September, 1950)
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phenomenon and in so doing asked themselves the
questions:

What is the essential nature of democracy?

How can democracy

realistically be operated within the legal limitations
of the
United States form of government?

They looked beyond the

formal legal constructs and discovered the alleged necessity
of political parties.

Parties V7ere then defended as the most

effective, if not the only practical way, to unite formal

government and the majority desires while preserving a substantial segment of minority rights.
The reconciliation of majority rule with minority rights,
a

continuing dilemma for democratic theorists, was solved to

the satisfaction of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow by means of the

doctrine of responsible parties.
a

Such parties would ensure

collective responsibility to the electorate on the part of

the governing members of the party.

These authors implied

that collective (party) responsibility such as they thought

they saw in Great Britain, insured that at least vocal and

influential constituencies would be heeded by the party seeking
electoral support.

Because the apex of political power was

dependent upon a successful search for support, the rights of

minorities would be recognized in the party attempts to forge
a

winning coalition of popular votes.

To these three ob-

servers of the American political scene, the lack of party

responsibility was an open invitation to the possible supression

of the rights of minorities since neither the Democratic
nor

Republican parties had either election platforms or programs
to which elective office-seeking party members were bound
to

adhere after their successful contest for office. 10
The responsible government explanation of American

parties was

a

result of the efforts of Wilson and his con-

temporaries to chart a path for the United States to move

toward a more democratic form of government.

They called for

parties which would be responsible to the electorate.

They

thought that the way to accomplish this desired goal was for
the party which was successful in attaining office to regard

itself as having a commitment to put into effect the campaign

promises by means of which it had successfully sought electoral support from the voters.

A. Lawrence Lowell, a contemporary student of American
parties of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow, made similar observations
of the United States party system but in the tradition of
James Madison, John C. Calhoun and John Fischer, among others,
Lowell alleged that Americans wished to stress minority rights,
if necessary at the expense of majority rule.
Thus Lowell
argued that the doctrines of Separation of Powers and Checks
and Balances both as written by the Founding Fathers and as
defended by the public--were an integral part of, and an expression of, the peculiarly American theory and practice of
government.
See Lowell's Public Opinion and Popular Government
(New York:
Longmans, Green and Company, 1913), John C. Calhoun,
A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse
The Bobbs-Merr ill Co., Inc., 1953; ori(Indianapolis, Ind.:
and John Fischer, "Government by
ginally published in 1853)
Concurrent Majority, " in Bishop and Hendel, Basic Issues of
American Democracy 6th ed., (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1970), pp. 432-442.

—

'

—

,

,

,

,
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These observers compared the British and
American functions of parties and thought that they saw
in Great Britain
a

system of responsible party government at work.

The later

studies of some scholars such as Lewis Namier suggest
that

the mandate concept was similar to the Montesquieu
description
of a separation of powers in the English governmental
system,

that neither construct in fact existed when it was observed
to exist by those scholars who thought they were engaged
in

describing an observed reality. 11
The mandate explanation assumes that there is an aware

electorate and that its political preferences exist and are
not created.

In addition, while party positions may be the

same on some issues, on others

a

action is presented to the voter.

clear alternative course of

The party which is suc-

cessful in attaining office by virtue of winning

a

plurality

of the seats, because of an acceptance by many voters of the

party's campaign promises as being desirable courses of action
for government to engage in, has a covenant or mandate to

enact its campaign pledges into law.

The mandate construct was attractive as a means of ex-

planation because of the positive connotations of the word
"responsible" in the fulfilling of campaign promises.

This

concept thus provided an excellent standard of measurement
xx The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III

(London:

The Macmillan Company, 1959).

,
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with which to gauge the behavior of politicians.

Perhaps its

most powerful appeal is that it brought under
one explanatory
umbrella the actions of voters and prospective office
holders,
the transformation of majority desires into
legislation, and

the ultimate dependence of those in power upon the
electorate.

Those holding a minority position on a question of public

policy were allowed an institutionalized means to strive to

become
law.

a

majority and thus to have their wishes enacted into

In addition,

as outlined above,

the rights of minorities

were felt to be protected through the "invisible hand" of

disciplined and responsible party competition for elective
office by means of coalition building.
In this explanation of the functioning of parties within
a framework of democratic government,

the wishes of the people

were deemed more important than the selection of leaders or
representatives to carry out those wishes.

The explanation

was primarily backward-directed in that the chosen leaders

were held to be obligated, because of their electoral mandate,
to enact into law their campaign promises made to the people. 12

Joseph Schumpeter critized the position of Wilson, Ford
and Goodnow that program enactment was more important than

leadership selection.

This criticism was based upon:

12

Class notes:
Political Science 361, Political Parties
Professor Roger Marz, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan.
Summer, 1966.
,
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the proposition that "the people" hold
a definite and rational opinion about every
individual
question and that they give effect to their
opinion
a democracy by chosing "representatives"
who
will see to it that opinion is carried out. 13
.

.

.

m

Schumpeter suggested that the emphasis upon the two
elements
of democracy, the deciding of political issues by
the elec-

torate and the selection of leaders, be reversed so that
the
element of leadership selection by primarily emphasized.

This

explanation for representative democracy then becomes forward

directed in that the elected are now primarily concerned with
remaining in office and will trim their political sails with
this end in view. 14

Their mandate has shifted from

a

ful-

fillment of past election promises to the personal one of

occupational self-preservation.

Schattschneider suggests much

the same approach when he defines democracy as:

... a competitive political system in which competing
leaders and organizations define the alternatives of
public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process. 15
The essence of the mandate explanation of parties is that
it is the only practical way in which to reconcile majority

desires and minority rights within a framework of government
13

Schumpeter, p. 269.

14

An excellent theoretical exploration of the implications
of this support maximization is Anthony Downs An Economic
Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
'

,

15

Elmer E. Schattschneider, p. 141.

referred to as representative democracy.

The primary func-

tion of party is that of peaceful reconciliation of divergent

views within

a

framework of choice of leadership.

The Marxian Explanation of Political Party

Karl Marx was primarily engaged in producing
theory of human history

—a

a

general

theory with political, economic,

sociological and historical validity and one which was based
upon what were alleged to be scientific or empirical laws of

human existence.

According to his analysis of man in society,

the establishment of a particular type of social organization
is

inevitable when certain conditions relating to the organ-

ization and evolution of the means of production and distrib-

ution of material goods have developed.

As one expert stated:

It would not be an exaggeration to say that
virtually all of Marxism is directed toward demonstrating this inevitability in a rigorously "scientific" manner, toward proving beyond any doubt that
social justice must come.

The economic foundations upon which industrial society
is constructed are subject to recurrent distributive crises

which increase the ranks of, and solidify, the workers behind their leaders.

These leaders are defected intellectuals

of bourgeois origin who are able to foresee the inevitable
16

Arthur

(New York:

Mendel, ed., Essential Works of Marxism
Bantam Books, 1965), p. 3.
P.

,
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collapse of the capitalist society.

The function of the

Communist Party members in this unfolding of the
historical
process is stated by Marx and Engels in the
Communist Manifesto

:

The Communists therefore, are on the one hand,
in the sphere of practice, the most advanced and
resolute section of the working-class parties of
every country, that section which pushes forward all
others; and on the other hand, in the sphere of
theory, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the
line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement. 17
Thus, to Marx and Engels, party as the activist core of

class is the means by which the masses are able to take full

advantage of a situation, the full development of which is
held to be inevitable.

This view of the function of party

has been consistently held, as demonstrated by the 1961

statement in The New Program of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union
a

,

that "The supreme goal of the party is to build

Communist society.

18

Lenin's Theory of Party

Marx and Engels were not activist revolutionaries in the
sense that Lenin was to become and their explanations of the
17

Basic Writings on
Lewis S. Fe.uer, ed. Marx and Engels:
Anchor Books,
New
York:
(Garden City,
Politics and Philosophy
Doubleday and Company, 195 9) p. 20.
,

,

,

Mendel, p. 373.
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origins, organization and function of political
parties was

modified by Lenin who, while excelling in both spheres
of
activity, was an organizer and a conspirator first,
and a

theoretician second.

Lenin was always able to justify his

chosen courses of action by reference to Marx and Engels but
his participation in concrete human events in an industrially

backward nation, necessitated many deviations from what contemporary Marxist scholars often regarded as orthodoxy.

One

of his most obvious deviations from Marx was in the area of

party organization, and to a lesser extent, party function. 19
As will be described below, the Chinese Communist Party under
the theory and application of Mao Tse-tung has also differed

from the intellectual party theory of Marx.

Both the Russian

and the Chinese leaders found it necessary to deviate from

Marxian orthodoxy because of the prime consideration of attracting support for their revolutionary activities 90 in an
industrially underdeveloped nation-state which had little in
the way of a manifest

— or

even latent

— proletariat.

In ad-

dition, both Lenin and Mao, as active revolutionaries, found
19

Our reference here is to party function in the presocialist revolutionary stage and not after the party has
assumed control of a substantial portion of the polity.
20

...

Or, especially in the case of Lenin, a minimum of
passive acquiescence on the part of the bulk of the indigenous

peasant population.

•
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that the spontaneity and inevitability of
the Marxian ex-

planation of party origins were of too extended
a time frame
for them to accomplish the overthrow of existing
social sys-

tems and the establishment of at least a socialist,
if not a
full communist polity, within their lifetimes.

Marx had believed that the party would arise and develop
as a natural result of increased tensions between the
two

great social classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The membership of the party was to coalesce around the magnet
of Marx's explanation of the gradual unfolding of social

development and would consist of the most astute and aware
members of the proletariat class. 21

would also include:

"

.

.

.a

This political party

portion of the bourgeois ideol-

ogists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending

theoretically the historical movement as
•

a

whole."

2?

These

recruits, presumably because of their capacity to think anal-

ytically or dialectically, would then "supply the proletariat

with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.

23

Marx

21

A frequently quoted statement of Marx is one to the
effect that:
"The emancipation of the working class is the
work of the working class itself." Quoted in George H. Sabine,
A History of Political Theory 3rd ed., (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 813.
,

22

Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto
Company, 1954), p. 34.
23

Ibid.

,

p.

33.

,

(Chicago:

Henry Regnery
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provides no explanation as to how one is to
reconcile this

alleged enlightenment on the part of some elements
of the

bourgeoisie with his views concerning the class basis
of all

bourgeoisie knowledge as part of the superstructure of
society.

A possible reconciliation

is that the

enlightenment

is of a methodological rather than an epistemological
nature.

In the realm of party organization, the Marxist party,

though revolutionary, is not clandestine.

Because of his

belief in class antagonisms as the motive force of history,

Marx apparently felt that no detailed description of the
necessary modes of specific party organization was necessary
as long as the existing revolutionary organization believed

fully in the function which was its place in Marxian history
to perform.

The primary function of the Marxian party was to nurture

and develop a sense of class consciousness within the ranks
of the proletariat

so that this great class would thus be

ready, willing and able to act on a united basis when the laws

of history dictated that the second, or socialist revolution,

was at hand. 24
24

Marx's ideas of historical evolution to the stage of
socialist revolution in countries without a large proletariat
were primarily outlined in his "Marginal Notes to the Program
of the German Worker's Party, 1875 (Critique of the Gotha
Program) published by Engels in 1891 and discussed in Sabine,
His central idea of "the revolution in permanence"
pp. 801-803.
was later utilized by Trotsky and Lenin as being well adapted
to the Russian situation of 1905-1917.
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In his analysis of the prerequisites and
conditions by

which

successful revolution could be accomplished in
Russia,

a

Lenin believed that there must be created a revolutionary

vanguard organized

as a political party.

This party was to

demand strict and unquestioned obedience and loyalty to the
decisions of the leadership, once such decisions had been
made.

The party would be comprised of a:
small compact core, consisting of reliable and
experienced hardened workers, with responsible agents
in the principal districts and connected by all the
rules of strict secrecy with the organization of
revolutionists.
.

.

.

.

.

This "vanguard" party was seen by Lenin as:

... an intelligent and instructed elite, essentially powerless in itself but capable of infinite
power if only it can harness the enormous drive of
social mass discontent and mass action. 6
Thus, with minor modifications, the theoretical explan-

ation of the origins of the Party are the same for both Marx

and Lenin.

The structures as outlined by both are also

similar in their surface manifestations to the extent that
the party membership was to be drawn from the same social

class

— the

"aware" bourgeoisie and "conscious" proletariat.

But Lenin, as the maker of a successful revolution in an
25

York:
26

Lenin, Collected Works Vol. TV, Book II,
International Publishers, n.d.), p. 194.

V.

I.

Sabine, p. 816.

,

(New
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industrially backward polity, was faced
with the problem of
a dearth of potential revolutionaries.

masses of peasants.

Instead, he had

The pragmatic necessity of staffing
his

movement with dedicated and yet pragmatic
revolutionary
Marxists forced him to modify both the structure
and the
functions of the party as these concepts had been
developed

by Karl Marx. 27
On the theoretical level, Lenin met this problem
by

reference to, and almost exclusive emphasis upon, a single
phrase in the Manifesto

:

bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending the historical
movement as a whole.
.

.

.

Such people were to be the Party of Lenin.

They would lead

the "aware" elements of the insignificant Russian proletariat
to,

and through the socialist revolution and on to the

promised land of a communist society.

The proletariat and

and elements of the Russian peasant class were the revolu-

tionary army with the party members to serve as the officer
corps.

Lenin justified the exclusion of enlightened elements

27

His staffing problems were further exacerbated by the
contending schools of Marxian interpretation exemplified in
Russia by the Bolshevicks and Mensheviks, and in Western
Europe by the Utopian (trade unionist or evolutionist) and
the "scientific" or revolutionist interpretations of what
Marx "really meant."
28

Marx, p. 34.
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of the proletariat from party influence
because he argued

that the:

proletariat clearly needed to be managed and
maneuvered by leaders who are not proletarians but
who know what the proletariat ought to want though
in fact they rarely do want it. 29
.

.

.

Lenin argued that left to themselves, without the yeast
of a
fully conscious cadre of activist party workers and leaders,
the proletariat would develop a "trade union" or evolutionary

consciousness but not

a

revolutionary fervor sufficient to

accomplish a successful socialist revolution.

mined not to see

a

He was deter-

Russian worker's movement develop along

the lines of what he felt was the compromised Social Demo-

cratic Party in Germany.

The "spontaneity" of worker and

peasant social discontent was to be harnessed, channeled and

controlled by the consciousness of the Party members, men
who one observer has called that:
intelligent and instructed elite, essentially
powerless in itself but capable of infinite power
if only it can harness the enormous drive of social
mass discontent and mass action.
.

.

.

Thus, the structure of the Party under the guidance of

the activist theoretician Lenin was modified when applied to
a

concrete historical situation.
29 Sabine,
3Q

rbid.

,

p.
p.

815.
816.

The membership strata of
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Marx was changed both quantitatively and qualitatively
and
the most basic function of the party now became the
instit-

utionalization of consciousness of party members and the
control and direction of lower class spontaneity.

Both were

accomplished in Soviet Russia by means of the administrative
decision-making principle of "democratic centralism."
Mao Tse-tung and Communist Party Theory

Karl Marx was a theoretician without peer in the realm
of the generation of dynamic and general explanations of

social man.

Lenin possessed a high degree of competence in

both theorizing and in actively promoting and accomplishing
a class based social revolution.

Mao Tse-tung'

s

strengths

are less in the field of theory than in the practice of

abrupt social change but his ex post facto modifications of

Marxian and Leninist party theory have become for many a
central component of Communist Party theory.

Thus, his ac-

ceptance of and deviations from both Marx and Lenin in the
areas of party origins, structure and function warrant con-

sideration.
Mao, as Lenin before him, was faced with the problem of

fomenting and bringing about a socialist upheaval in a polity

which lacked

a

numerically large industrial proletariat.

China this class was almost totally nonexistent.

In

Lenin had

45

justified his utilization of the small and weak Russian
proletariat class plus a very few enlightened Russian peasants,
led by the "vanguard party," by reference to one rather ob-

scure phrase in the Manifesto 31
.

Mao accepted this Leninist

interpretation of the origins and membership of the party
rather than the Marxian explanation which leaned heavily upon

staffing the organization with enlightened and alienated

proletarians who had developed a high degree of militant
class consciousness.

wholly

a

The party of Lenin and Mao was almost

vanguard of dedicated former bourgeoisie.

One ob-

server has stated:

Mao's Chinese Communist Party was never a class
party of the peasants; it is a totalitarian cadre
party which during the civil war relied primarily on
peasant support, but as a ruling party has long since
proved its ability to manipulate and if necessary,
oppress the peasants no less effectively than it
manipulates and oppresses China's other social
classes 2
.

.

.

.

The basic structure of the Communist Party was similar
in the thinking of both Mao and Lenin.

They both realized

that a high degree of discipline and dedication on the part
of party members was necessary for the success of the revol-

ution and that acceleration of the inevitable class conflict
dialectic of Marx made necessary
31

a

clandestine organization

Marx, p. 34.

Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration
Oxford University Press, 1966),
(New York:
of a Secular Faith
,

p.

110.
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so as to avoid persecution at the
hands of agents of the

bourgeoisie
The most pronounced digression in
Maoist party theory,

both from Marx and from Lenin, is in the
primary function
which the party is to perform.

For Marx the party primarily

exists to educate the proletariat to an awareness
of the

inevitable class struggle, peaceful or violent.

For Lenin

the most important party consideration is the
realization of
a

Communist society as this concept is understood by party

theoreticians who are also expert practical politicians so
as to ensure that mass spontaneity is subject to
party-

interpreted consciousness.
Mao Tse-tung has gradually substituted the elitist inter-

pretations of party function of Marx and Lenin with a populist

explanation as to the proper role of the party in
society.

a

communist

The vehicle for this transformation has been his

idea of the "mass line,

party to this concept.

"

and the proper relationship of the

Mao's utilization of this idea as the

source of party inspiration has given rise to his most obvious

divergence from Lenin who stressed the consciousness of party
regulars as a check upon mass spontaneity.

To Mao, the party

must at all times trim its sails in recognition of what the
people desire.

47

The mass line is the basic line of the
Party
and this line must be followed at all
times, by all
departments, and for all types of work.
During the
period of the revolutionary wars, the Party
in all
its work used the method of integrating
the efforts
of the leadership and the masses. 33
In assessment of the central importance of
the mass line in

party policy formation, one observer has stated:
No method of operation is more characteristic
of the Maoist era of Chinese Communist Party
history
than the "mass line" according to which the Party
derives its policies from the ideas of the people
themselves and then leads the people on the basis of
these policies.
The greatest guarantee of eventual success in any enterprise is believed to be the
support of the masses, and the day-to-day modus
operandi for every type of chore is:
"Learn from
" 34
the masses, unite with the masses.
.

.

.

#

It was the contention of Karl Marx that he had stood

Hegel on his head in that he had removed Hegel's dialectical

methodology from the realm of epistemology and had demonstrated
to his own satisfaction that the dialectic was the driving

force in the historical evolution of social man.

Now, through

his concept of the "mass line" and its relationship to the

Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung has righted Hegel again

by maintaining that the primary function of the party
33

34

is to

Peoples Daily (Peking), February 11, 1963.

Chalmers Johnson, "Building a. Communist Nation in China,"
The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements Robert A. Scalapino, ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 52.
,
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discover and follow the wishes of the people. 35
The communist theories of political party as
developed

by Marx, Lenin and Mao are thus similar in their
explanations
of the origins of parties.

Both Lenin and Mao agree as to

the structure of the party and their primary divergence
from

Marx is that, as practical revolutionaries, they saw the
necessity of secret organization as

a

means of protection

until the successful socialist revolution has been accomplished
In the area of party theory, Mao differs from both Marx and

Lenin when he argues that the primary function of the party
is not to lead the masses along the inevitable one true path

to Communism as discovered and promulgated by party theore-

ticians, but rather to act as the agent of the masses in

articulation of their inherent capacity to eventually, by
trial and error, develop and operate a communist polity.

In

non-communist polities all three observers share similar views

— that

the primary function of the party is that of successful

replacement of existing governments with one which is dedicated to the realization of a collectivist society.
35

There is apparently little to no exploration in Chinese
Communist literature as to the political controversy which
turns on the question as to whether such an entity as the
"will of the people" does in fact exist.
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Theory Orientat ion

As tools of explanation and thus understanding,
both of

these party models have serious deficiencies.

The Communist

theory is highly normative and the responsible
government
theory is ambiguous as to its foundations and
orientations.

Marx and Engels developed their explanation of human
history as a criticism of the industrial life of their
era.
They advocated through their theory a means of establishing
social justice which is a normative concept.

As stated by

Riker when he alleges that the inclusion of normative elements
in a descriptive generalizations renders it scientifically

unfit
This, for example, is where Marx's endeavor to
be scientific went astray. The main proposition of
Capital can be summarized as "Capitalism is theft,
and since theft when divorced from a positive legal
system is a normative notion, verification of this
sentence as a description of nature is literally
impossible

—

—

The concept of "proletariat,

"

a

vital component of the

Communist political theory of social change through class
struggle is itself a normative concept:
The proletariat is a mythical notion and, at
the same time the supreme value, good and justice
a positive power.
The distinction between proletariat and the bourgeoisie does not record an

illiam H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions
Yale University Press, 1961), p. 5.

(New Haven:

,
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empirical fact observed as such in actual
existence;
it is, first and foremost, an
appreciation, a (value)
judgment.

Berdyaev adds that Marx could not have based his
theory of
social change upon class antagonisms without using
normative

judgments as to the social justice provided by different

means of organization of the modes of production.

Party,

in

the vanguard of this social change, engages in a normatively

oriented function in working to establish

a

better life for

all.

The responsible government explanation of parties presents no clear answer as to its normative or empirical emphasis.

This is because, as Austin Ranney has shown, its

advocates have not been explicit in defining whether they
are discussing parties as they observe them, or parties as

they should be if they are to fulfill their primary task of
the reconciliation of majority desires and minority rights.

Ranney shows this ambiguity to continue to exist as demonstrated by the landmark study of party government in the

United States which was published by the American Political
37

Nicholas Berdyaev, The Russian Revolution
(Ann Arbor
The University of Michigan Press, 1961) pp. 68-69.
,

,

-^Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Gov(Urbana, Illinois:
ernment:
Its Origins and Present State
The University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 8-10.
,
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Science Association in 1950.
in most of the writings on

39

He accurately observes that

responsible government and the

mandate concept of parties:
Parties are often referred to in one place as
the existing organizations, and in another as
(b) some possible future variant of them.
Functions
(of parties) sometimes means (1) the role the
parties are observed performing, and sometimes
(2) the role they should perform. 40
(a)

When discussing parties in sense

(a)

and (1), observations

are empirical and when in sense (2), judgments are normative.

Theory Inclusiveness

Both the responsible government and the Communist
theories of party are not inclusive enough to explain all of
the relevant phenomena.

The mandate explanation is primarily

an explanation of, and a suggested plan for improvement of,

popular control over the leaders of the political community.
This theory does not attempt to explain the concept of party
as understood by Communist observers who regard party as the

active agent of those who are in possession of a cosmic truth

which must be implemented as quickly as possible in the

•^"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, " American
Political Science Review XLIV, (Supplement, Sept., 1950).
,

4Q Ibid.

,

p.

8.

political community. 41
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The Marxists regard non-communist

parties as essentially the tools of the
bourgeoisie and

therefore not true parties since they are
not tuned to the

ultimate goals which society must achieve.
Thus, both of these explanations of party
are mutually

exclusive and since neither is broad enough
to include the
other, neither can be called a general empirical
theory of

parties in terms of its inclusiveness characteristics.
Range of Theory

The responsible government model of party is

range theory.

a

middle

It incorporates many singular generalizations

concerning voter and party activity patterns.

These include

the desires of citizens, actions of voters, how changes in
game rules will affect both voters and office seekers, how

aspirants seek and win electoral office, and policy changes.

From these singular generalizations, the observer

is able to

move outside the boundaries of his own observables.

He can

generalize about other systems that seem to exhibit the

necessary conditions or ground rules so as to appear to qualify
within the definitional bounds that ho has established as the
limits of the phenomenon which his theory is attempting to explain
41 Some

qualification is here required to account for the
primary function of the party in an established communist
polity as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung.

53

This explanation is not a general theory in
terms of

theory range since its emphasis is upon function,
and the
origin and institutional (structural) aspects of
party are
not dealt with to any significant degree within the
explan-

atory framework which the mandate model provides.
The Communist theory of party is of general range.

The

general principle of organization is that the mode of economic

organization breeds class conflict and this conflict is the
force behind social change. 42

This explanation of the dy-

namics of human society contains singular generalizations
such as the alleged motivation of different groups in the

political community.

In addition,

one is able to move to

broader generalizations concerning not only contemporary
political communities, but also the prediction of future
events.

That such sweeping generalizations and extensions of

the theory do not always meet the test of validity is not a

basis for criticism of the generality of the theory, but
rather a criticism of its normative foundations.

The theory

includes explanations for party origins, structure and functions, and the place of party in the social dynamic.

be classified as

a

It must

general theory in terms of range because

...
Sciences
Maurice Duyerger, An Introduction to the Social
with Special Reference to their Methods trans, by Malcolm
Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 239.

42

"

"

,
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of the wide scope of phenomenal characteristics
which it

attempts to explain.

Concept ualizations of Political Party
The responsible government explanation of
political

parties is a mental construct which is highly
reflective of

assumptions concerning man's capacity and propensity
to govern himself which were dominant in Western Europe
and North

America in the century and
olution.

a

half following the French Rev-

The theory conceptualizes party as the vehicle

through which political man is enabled to exercise his alleged
desire to participate fully in his own governance and his

assumed capacity to act rationally within the context of the

Utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest
number, rather than within a narrower context of individual

self-interest.

43

The political philosophy supporting this

explanation has little room for an economic type of "indivlsible hand" such as that postulated by Adam Smith. 44
.

.

The widespread and rapid utilization of this explanatory

framework for parties
43

—both

by influential students of parties

.

This view was dominant but by no means totally accepted
as the writings of such observers as Alexis deTocqueville,
Edmund Burke, or Alexander Hamilton and James Madison demonstrate.
See especially Madison's Federalist #10
.

44

The Wealth of Nations
(New York:
1937; originally published in 1776).
,

Modern Library, Inc.,
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and by politicians— plus its generally uncritical
acceptance
as conventional wisdom until the post World War II method-

ological revolution in the Social Sciences, 45 demonstrate
that this approach to the explanation of parties comes within
the context of what Karl Mannheim called "ideology." 46

Not

until well into mid-century did party theoreticians such as

Schumpeter 47 and Schattschneider 48 in advance of the method,

ological revolution called behavioralism, seriously question
the normative conceptual frameworks within which "democratic"

political parties were being explained.

The 1950 report of

the Committee of the American Political Science Association

demonstrates that the idea of responsible parties, as a goal
to be striven for, was still very much alive.
In contrast to the responsible parties theory of demo-

cracy, the theory of political parties developed by Karl Marx
is

clearly a "utopian construct," 49 in the sense that, while
45

There are many exceptions to this general acceptance of
the majority of scholars. See, for example, Arthur F. Bentley,
The Process of Government
(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press
1908)
,

,

46

Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology
(New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., n.d.;
of Knowledge
originally published in 1936)
,

47

Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy

The Semi-Sovereign People:
In America.
4 ^Mannheim,

.

A Realist's View of Democracy

see especially Chapter 4.

56

most of the conceptual elements of his
explanation of historical development were present in his intellectual
ante50
^
*
cedents,
his synthesis of conceptual elements and the
,

.

explanatory function of his philosophy of history were
clearly

marked deviations from the dominant wisdom of his time.
Marx,

Thus

in his early emphasis upon individual alienation and

social disintegration of the family and other primary groups,
was reacting to the social thought dominated by an individ-

ualistic conception of human motivations.

Lenin and Mao,

within the context of the specific polities in which they
operated in their pre-revolut ionary phases, were also clearly
on the Utopian end of the Mannheim dichotomy.

Both the responsible government and the communist party
explanations now express dominant social values for major,

but exclusive sections of the globe and the task of contemporary party theorists

is,

in part, to surmount the normative

epistomological relativity of both explanations if a general
empirical theory of political parties

is to be generated.

50 Examples are the
dialectic in Hegel and the idea of class
struggle developed by men such as Saint-Simon. For discussions
of Marx's intellectual precursors see Irving M. Zeitlin,
Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 3-79, and
Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 7-120.
,

,
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As Anthony King has demonstrated, 51 the level
of ab-

straction at which political party is conceptualized has
important ramifications for the type of question concerning

parties which the theorist is motivated to ask.

Party, when

conceived as a cluster of human actors, generates questions

concerning party ideology, structure and organization.

When

party is conceived as a pattern of human activities, the

theorist is able to:
consider the consequences of parties and party
systems their existence, structure and behavior
for political systems as a whole.
.

.

.

—

In the writings of the responsibile party theorists,

parties were conceived of at the higher level of abstraction
thus generating questions concerning party as the producer of

consequences for the political system as a whole. 53

This

position is consistent in the writings of Wilson, Ford and

Goodnow to the extent that the consequences of the entity
party which they wished to establish in the American system
of government, were increased levels of, and more direct voter
51
3X
King.
•

52

Ibid

53

,

p.

115.

King suggests that these observers conceptualized party
"as they were bound to do given their reformist
aims," (p. 133.) My focus of analysis is upon their theory
In the
of party rather than their reformist propensities.
former or explanatory aspect of their studies, these observers
conceived of party in terms of its systemic consequences.
as a group,
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control over, the actions of elected
officials.

The weakness

of this level of abstraction is
a failure to ensure that the

concept is:
defined at all precisely, with the result
.
that
it may be impossible to know how
one would go about
.

.

determining whether statements containing
it were
true or false.

This conceptual weakness also shared decades
later by the

Committee of the American Political Science
55
Association,
has resulted in explanatory ambiguities which
inhibit this

explanation as a contribution to

a

general empirical theory

of parties.

The Marxist-Communist explanation of parties, like
the

responsibile government construct contains both

a pragmatic,

low level of abstraction where party is conceptualized as a

collectivity, and a higher explanatory level where party is

regarded as a producer of system-wide consequences.

On the

one hand party is described as the "vanguard of the proletariat
In other instances in the writing of Marx,
is

Lenin and Mao, party

discussed within the context of the anticipated consequences

which the existence of the party will have for the polity.
available evidence suggests that Marx, and to

a lesser extent

pre-revolutionary Lenin and Mao, conceptualized party as
54

Austin Ranney, see especially pp. 8-10 and

55

Report

.

The

p.

157.

a

special group of dedicated
revolutionaries.

After their

successful revolutions, Lenin
and Mao placed more entasis
upon parties as the agent of
systemic occurrences. This
shift in emphasis to a more
balanced approach in their explanation of parties is no doubt
due in large part to the

unique role which the communist
parties of the Soviet Union
and China have been called upon
to play in the evolving of
these socialist polities.
Thus, as an explanatory tool in
the understanding of

communist political parties, the conceptual
level utilized by
Marxist theoreticians is weak because
of ambiguities of referent.

Summary

The two most comprehensive early attempts
to explain political parties, the mandate-responsibile
government and the

communist explanations have been outlined and analyzed
in
terms of their validity as empirical general
theories of

parties.

Both have been demonstrated to be unsatisfactory,

the responsible government theory on all counts and
the

Communist on three of the four standards of analytical assessment.

The responsible government explanation is exclusive,

of only middle range, and its proponents are not clear as to

whether they are discussing parties in a normative or an
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empirical context.

In addition,

the level of conceptual-

ization of the dependent variable is such that tautologies
are encouraged.

The Communist theory is a general theory in

terms of range but it is of very high normative content, like
the mandate explanation is also exclusive in that the full

range of phenomena to be explained is not included, and it
suffers from inexplicit conceptualizations.

explanation serves as a valid basis for

a

Thus neither

general empirical

theory of parties.
We now turn to what Maurice Duverger called his "preliminary general theory of parties" to attempt to apply the
same standards of assessment in order to judge its validity
as a general party theory.

CHAPTER
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III

THE DUVERGER APPROACH TO PARTY THEORY

j

i

We have suggested that for a theorist to
present

a

valid

claim to have developed a general theory of
political parties,
his construct must pass the tests of:

resting upon an

(a)

adequate base of empirical observables,

(b)

including all of

the relevant phenomena to be explained,

(c)

being of broad

range, scope or reach, and

(d)

demonstrating conceptual

adequacy of the dependent variable to be explained.

Two major

efforts to understand the phenomenon "political party," the

responsible government and the communist explanations have
been shown to be inadequate as general empirical theories of
parties according to the above criteria.

The work of Maurice

Duverger in explaining parties will now be analyzed.

1

will suggest that the primary contribution of Duverger

We
is

that

of providing two empirical generalizations concerning parties,
one of doubtful validity, and taxonomies based upon parties
and party system structures, but no general empirical theory
of parties.

.

Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and
Activity in the Modern State trans, by Barbara and Robert
North, (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951).
,
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Duverqer and Methodology

Many scholars who are concerned with
methodology agree
with Duverger 2 that necessary steps in
empirical theory construction would include

(1)

explicit definitions which demon-

strate the parameters of, and describe the
phenomenon to be
explained;

(2)

taxonomies of specific empirical occurrences

of the phenomenon which are useful and valid to
the extent

that they emphasize independent and intervening variables

and demonstrate the allowable ranges of variable influence

upon the phenomenon; and

(3)

generalizations which contain

or imply empirically testable hypotheses.

It is our con-

tention that the work of Duverger, in his book Political
Parties

,

is at the

taxonomic level of achievement in theory

building, a necessary step in the process but one which is

not yet at the level of "preliminary general theory." 3

An assessment of his contribution to analytical stasiology
must therefore be concerned with an analysis of the validity
of his generalizations concerning parties and party systems.
2 Duverger,

An Introduction to the Social Sciences with
Special Reference to Their Methods trans, by Malcolm
Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964)
,

3

Political Parties, p. XIII.
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In his later work on methodology of
the social sciences,

Duverger has stated that the generation
of valid generalizations of "sociological laws" requires
two preliminary levels

and a final level of scholarly activity.

Three levels of scientific research can be
distinguished in the physical and social sciences:
the
levels of description, classification and
explanation.
Formulation of laws is present only at the last
stage
•

•

•

It is the contention of this observer that
Duverger

'

s

Pol-

itical Parties does not contain generalizations which
are

valid with regard to all parties,

5

and that his "Law of Party

Number" with reference to electoral systems and party systems
is valid only part of the time.

The Classification Scheme of Duverger

In Political Parties the author uses as the basis of his

classification of parties the structure of the individual
party.

He is aware of other factors such as ideology, his-

torical context and socio-economic influences, but to him

party

organization is tending to become an essential factor
in the activity of the party, in its influence and
4

"•'

."

An Introduction to the Social Sciences.

.

.

,

p.

226.

The work of Duverger is especially weak in any explanation of, or even reference to, Latin American, African or
Asian parties or party systems.
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its function.
These facts explain the general
tenor of the book. b

Duverger goes on to say that party
organization may be
considered as superstructure and the other
factors as substructure, the influence between these
two levels is a two-

way street, and that for him modern party
evolution
explained by

a

is

best

study of party structure and organization.

He

then classifies parties on the basis of his
perception of the

party organizations and he discovers parties
to be "centralized" and "decentralized."

bership,

He discerns two criteria of mem-

"cadre" and "mass" parties and he perceives
dif-

ferences in parties which are based upon the federal
as op-

posed to the unitary geo-political organization of the
polity

Duverger outlines various classifications of parties

which are based upon his perception of party structures.

He

does not give us a "preliminary general theory of parties."

One observer has commented that:

Duverger does not keep to his original methodological promise.
Instead of a continuous testing
of a hypothetical working model, we get sound and
methodical classification.
as the pilot work
for further stasiological studies. 7
.

^Political Parties.

.

p.

.

XV.

7

Frederick C. Englemann, "A Critique of Recent Writings
on Political Parties," The Journal of Politics Vol. 19, #3,
(August, 1957), pp. 423-440 and especially p. 433.
,
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Another observer states that "Duverger
seems, at times, to
be interested only in description and
methodical classification.

1,8

To Duverger himself, there appears to be

a

confusion as

to the nature of his contribution to a general
party theory;
at which of the three levels of explanatory
activity his

Political Parties should be placed.
In the preface to this work he states that his aim
is to

sketch:

...

preliminary general theory of parties, vague,
conjectural and of necessity approximate which may
yet serve as a basis and guide for detailed studies. 9
a

He continues that his work is designed to introduce objectivity
into what he regards as a highly normative field of inquiry,

that his work supplies a methodological classification of

parties and that it:
formulate (s) hypotheses capable of guiding
further research which will one day permit the
formulation of authentic sociological laws. 10
.

.

.

Given his goal of the development of

a

preliminary general

party theory which will point the way for further research in
Q

itics,,
9

Ferdinand A. Hermens, book review in The Review of
XIV,

(October,

Duverger, Political Parties.

10 Ibid.

Duverge
To Duverger,
laws" are valid generalizations.
,

p.

XIV.

Pol-

1952), p. 558.
.

p.

XIII.

"authentic sociological
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this area, we must attempt to discover
and outline his theory
so that it can be measured against
the criteria of theory

orientation, inclusiveness

,

range and level of conceptual-

ization, standards which have been presented
in this paper
as being measurements with which to
assess the validity of a

general empirical theory of parties.
Political Parties is divided into two sections,
the first

dealing with individual parties, and the second with
national
party systems.

The most general "sociological law" or gen-

eralization is stated in Book II where Duverger

dealing

is

with party systems rather than with individual parties.
the other hand, Book

I

concerning all parties.

On

does not present any generalizations
It is concerned with classification

of individual parties in a cross-polity approach but not an

approach which is universal in scope.

Both sections of the

work emphasize the structure of parties and of party systems.
In this emphasis Duverger chooses to study parties as instit-

utions.

He then implies that structure is the most important

variable leading to an explanation of the phenomenon called
party.
the principal object of this work Political
Parties is.
essentially the study of party
institutions and their place in the state.
Modern parties are characterized primarily by their
anatomy.
.

..

.

(

.

)

.

.

11 Ibid...

/

p.

XV.

.
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Thus, party structure rather than
party function is the

aspect of the study of political parties
which Duverger
chooses to emphasize.

He assumes that function will
follow

from structure of both party and party system
and that it
can be explained in terms of a comparative
study of instit-

utional structure.

T he "Theory" of Political Parties

What is the essence of the theory of parties of Duverger?
In the opinion of some scholars 12 and of this observer,

he

has given us no theory of individual parties or of party

systems but rather

a

narrow gauge or singular generalization

involving one variable only, that of the individual electoral

system or political community within the context of which the
party system operates.

This generalization concerns the in-

stitutional context and the result is Duverger 's now famous
"Law of Party Number" which holds that

"...

the simple-

majority, single-ballot system favors the two-party system."

Duverger adds in the next sentence that
of all the hypotheses that have been defined in
this book, this approaches most nearly perhaps to a
true sociological law.
The exceptions are very
.

.

.

.

12

13

See,

.

for example, Frederick C. Englemann, p. 433.

Political Parties.

.

.

,

p.

217.

rare and can generally be explained
as the result
of special conditions. 14
In addition,

regarding multi-party systems in
specific pol-

itical communities, he states that:

... the simple-majority system with second ballot
and proportional representation favor
multi-partism. 15
Duverger has himself admitted that there are
exceptions to
these generalizations, as have other observers
who appear to

have less faith than he in these "sociological
laws." 16
If we beg the question as to the validity
of this "Law

of Party Number," we must deal yet with the Law
as the most

obvious example of Duverger

parties."

m

s

"preliminary general theory of

so doing it becomes obvious that, at least
with

14 T
Ibid,
,

15

Ibid.

,

p.

239.

16

See especially the critique by Aaron B. Wildavsky, "A
Methodological Critique of Duverger s Political Parties,"
Journal of Politics, Vol. 21, (May, 1959), pp. 303-318, 'and
the work of John G. Grumm, "Theories of Electoral Systems,"
Midwest Journal of Politics Vol. II, #4, (1958), pp. 357-376.
Grumm finds many West European examples which are at variance
with Duverger' s Law of Party Number. In addition, see Douglas
Rae The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 108-109.
However, other observers such as V. 0. Key and Carl J.
Friedrich lend support to the thesis of Duverger who has
apparently recognized his critics in that a later work of his,
in discussing the alleged relationship between numbers of
parties and the electoral system, is less dogmatic. Duverger,
The Idea of Politics: The Uses of Power in Society
(London:
Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1966), pp. 114-116.
'

.

'

,

,
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respect to these generalizations, the
author is referring to

party systems within the context of
individual political
communities and not to specific parties within
a cross-polity
frame of reference.

Theory Orientation

We have suggested above that an analytical framework
with which to assess a general empirical theory of parties
consists of measurement of the explanation by means of the
four criteria of explanatory orientation,

inclus iveness

of conceptualization, and theory range or scope.

,

level

To what

extent does the party explanatory work of Duverger measure
up to these criteria?

There seems little doubt that Political

Parties is an empirical effort. 17

Duverger has confined his

efforts to furthering the explanation of existing party entities and has not attempted to suggest what parties or party
systems should be.

His quest for sociological laws of parties

has neither a base of highly normative assumptions such as
the communist explanation, nor has he demonstrated or ientational
17

"The main pioneering work in the systematic empirical
study of party systems is Maurice Duverger s Political
Parties (1951)." Harry Eckstein, "Political Parties," Part
II.
"Party Systems," International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences Vol. 11, (1968), p. 429.
'

,
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ambiguity of the type demonstrated by many
observers of the
responsible party approach to explanation.

Theory Indus ivencss

The "preliminary general theory" of
Duverger is more

inclusive than either of these other two
explanations in that

both competitive party systems of the responsible
variety,
and monolithic parties of the communist variety
are included
in his taxonomic formulations. 18

However, as stated above,

his work includes little of explanatory value to
assist us in

understanding parties and party systems in the Third World
of
allegedly politically underdeveloped polities of Latin
America

Asia or Africa.

Even if we grant legitimacy to his claim of

developing preliminary theoretical tools, the omission of

many of the parties and party systems of the globe renders
invalid any claim to his work being a general explanatory
effort.

However, on the level of party origins and structure

Duverger has provided

a

series of incomplete but useful con-

cepts as a preliminary base upon which taxonomies of Third

World parties can be constructed.

Some critics of Duverger have seen even this degree of
inclusiveness as a distinct disadvantage. F. A. Hermans
argues that "Duverger s conclusion begins on a pessimistic
note and reads almost like what Robert Michels wrote on the
'Iron Law of Oligarchy.'
Part of this pessimism may again be
due to the fact that he (Duverger) deals with totalitarian
parties on the same level as with the others.
."
Hermens,
•

•

1

.

p.

561.
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Duverger and Party Conceptualization

With respect to the level of conceptualization
of party

j

utilized by Duverger, his work clearly
demonstrates that he
conceives of parties as clusters of human
actors rather than
as patterned interactions.

This is shown by his explanatory

emphasis upon the structure and organization
of parties and

party systems and his almost total ignoring of the:
.

.

—

consequences of parties and party systems
their existence, structure and behavior— for
political systems as a whole. 19
.

.

His later diluted "Law of Party Number" does suggest
system-

wide consequences resulting from particular electoral arrange-

ments but even in this instance the level of conceptualization
is of the first order, as demonstrated by his failure to deal

with the societal effects which differing electoral modes
might, or in fact actually do, generate.

In addition,

Pol-

itical Parties contains no recognition of the fact that elec-

toral systems are sometimes devised independently of the desires of party members, the decisive thrust coming in such

instances from interest groups, tribal organizations, or

Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies
Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity Vol. 2, (Winter, 1969),
,

p.

115.
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other conglomerates which have

a

perceived stake in the

political processes of the polity. 20

We have stated that the act of
observer conceptualization
is

the expression of his value preferences
and, in addition,

the degree of acceptability of his
concepts is a reflection
of current conventional wisdom within
his discipline.

Thus

the responsible party explanation enjoyed
widespread and

quite uncritical success for many decades
because of the inter-

pretation of this explanation which emphasized its
normative
aspects in support of democratic values.
explanation,

The communist party

in the first half-century of its dissemination,

was the antithesis of the responsible party government
ex-

planation.

As such it lacked a geo-political base to support

its claim to legitimacy.

Over the past half-century, the

expansion of this base to include half of the globe has greatly
increased its explanatory acceptibility
The Duverger conceptualization of party, because of its

greatly reduced normative content in comparison to either of
these other explanations, has enjoyed widespread academic
support because of the timing of its presentation at the
20

—

Indigenous administrators in newly freed colonies as the
former agents of the colonial power have exercised considerable influence in the establishment of electoral ground rules.
Such rules have often been first established by the colonial
power.
See Lucian W. Pye, "Party Systems and National Development in Asia," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds
Political Parties and Political Development
(Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 369-398, especially p. 383

—

.

,

,
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beginning of the behavioralist thrust in
Political Science
which followed World War II.

The Duverger explanation pre-

sents us with a useful attempt to overcome
the normative

epistemological relativity of both the responsible
party
government and the communist explanations of
political
parties

The Range of Duverger

'

s

Theory

The explanatory framework of Duverger is an example
of

scholarly effort of the middle range of theory building.

In

his book Political Parties he has moved beyond the area of

singular generalizations concerning the covariance of two

variables as described by David Easton, 21 and has incorporated
into his preliminary theory, explanations of both party

origins and party structure.

Some scholars have argued that

Duverger has placed too much emphasis upon the structure of
parties and party systems as the single most important ex-

planatory variable.

Samuel Beer holds that Duverger tries to

explain a rigidly doctrinaire party on the basis of its structure but a complete explanation should also be cognizant of
of the possibility of such factors as individual member
21

_

"'

•'

'

'

•

A Systems Analysis of Political Life
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 7.

,

(New York: John
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beliefs, the constitutional structure
of the polity, and the
locus of party militants within the
geo-political polity. 22

Another observer has criticized Political
Parti p. by suggesting that Duverger assumes that:
political party phenomenon can be largely
explained through the independent use of
three variables:
party structure, party systems and the
electoral system. Other factors such as social
and
economic structure, national history, culture,
institutional traditions, geography, climate and
so
on are either rejected neglected, or relegated
to
peripheral roles.
.

.

.

.

Another student of political parties, Sigmund Neumann,
in an
article in which he discusses political party theory,
makes
the

point that Duverger places exclusive emphasis on formal

party structure as the key to party behavior and ignores
social mass base and ideological commitments." 24

"
.

.

.

A

critical question in theory construction is the choice of

a

basis for the typology to be used.
There is thus wide agreement of opinion among students of
parties that a structural approach to party explanation, while
22

Samuel Beer, "Les Partis Politique," The Western Political Quarterly Vol. VI, pp. 9-53.
,

23

Wildavsky, p. 309.

Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Theory of Political Parties,"
World Politics #6, (July, 1954), p. 559.
,
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useful in the generation of

a

general explanation, is only

another step in the construction of a
general empirical

theory of parties and not the "preliminary
general theory"
of parties as offered by Duverger.

One observer has suggested that each major
section of

Duverger

's

book contains a single important contribution
to

the study of parties.

Book

I

offers his classification of

party structures:
(in which) he is very successful.
Systematic
classification done with scientific neutrality, useful categories such as direct and indirect parties,
caucus, branch, cell and militia type basic organ-'
izational elements:
cadre and mass parties and
electors, supporters and militants 2 ^
.

.

.

Book II offers his "Law of Party Number."

Englemann does not

seem to feel that there is an excess of party types and subtypes.

In addition,

he does not question Duverger

'

s

choice

of party structure as the critical variable in his taxonomy.

Duverger and the Functionalist Approach to Party Theory

The implied assumption of Duverger appears to be that

a

taxonomy of parties which is based upon their structures will
lead to valid generalizations concerning parties, from which
a

general theory of parties can then be constructed.
25

Englemann, pp. 423-440.

However,
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parties exhibit not only institutional
structures, but also

engage in functions and these functions
are more universal
in nature than are structural attributes. 26

Thus it should

be possible to devise a functional typology
of parties which
contains fewer divisions, and fewer exceptions,
than the

typology based upon origins and structures which
is presented
by Duverger.

Abraham Kaplan states that:
The function of scientific concepts is to mark
the categories which will tell us more about our
subject matter than any other categorical sets.

Without suggesting

a

blanket negation of the work of Duverger,

what is herein suggested is that

a

structural classification

of parties is only a partial step toward a general theory of

parties.

What is needed in addition is a typology which

cognizant of the functions which parties perform.

is

Such a

functional taxonomy should free the observer from the limitations of the individual polity, or special conditions with
26

"Recourse to functional typologies is indispensable for
the comparative study of very different societies:
institutions are too unlike to provide a satisfactory basis for
comparison.
It is also possible that in some respects the
functional approach is more fruitful for the elaboration of
general theories than the institutional, approach, " Duverger,
An Introduction to the Social Sciences.
p. 235.
.

27

~ -

—

.

,

Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry
Methodology for
Behavioral Science
(San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co.,
:

,

1964), p. 52.

which the structuralist typology
of Duverger appears to
prone.

be^

Duverger himself, in his work on
social science

methodology, states that there are
three basic foundat::ions

upon which a typology can be constructed:
or structural,

(2)

relational, and

(3)

institutional

(1)

functional.

With

regard to the functional foundation he
admits that:
Recourse to functional typologies is
indispensable for the comparative study of very
different
societies:
institutions are too unlike to provide
a satisfactory basis for comparison.
It is also
possible that in some respects the functional
approach (to classification) is more fruitful
for the
elaboration of general theories than the institut iona 1 approach 2 8
By the time of the writing of this later work
on methodology, no doubt Duverger would no longer claim that
his

earlier study was a "preliminary general theory of parties."
His later opinion as quoted above appears to contradict
his

claim to a theory or perhaps even a preliminary theory of
parties in his earlier work, Political Parties

.

The importance of party function is also stressed by

Almond and Coleman who state that:
If the functions

(in a political system such as

interest articulation, aggregation, communication, etc.) are there then the structure must
be., even though we may find them (the structures)

Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences.
p.

235.

.

.

,
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tucked away so to speak, in nooks
and crannies of
other social systems. 13
It thus seems that a strong case
can be made for a tax-

onomy of parties, based not upon structure
alone, but pri-

marily upon the common functions in which
they are seen to
engage.

Such an approach, because of its cross-polity
char-

acteristics, is more apt to eventually yield a
general theory
of parties than is the more narrow and unique
structural

approach of Duverger.
In his perceptive critique of Duverger, Aaron
Wildavsky

concludes that if the current quest for general party
theory
is to be advanced,

political parties need perhaps to be

studied not according to "surface forms" or party institutions

but in the functions they perform.
the utilization of surface factors such as the
.
number of parties, the type of ballot, and the type
of party structure do not appear to provide the kind
of proposition to provide an adequate theory and/or
typology of political parties. 30
.

.

It is to an exploration of the opportunities and limitations

upon the search for such relevant propositions that we now
turn our attention.

29 Gabriel A.
Almond and James S. Coleman, eds
itics of the Developing Areas
(Princeton, N. J.
University Press, I960), p. 12.
,

30

Wildavsky, pp. 317-318.

:

.

,
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CHAPTER

iv

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICAL
PARTY THEORY DEVELOPMENT
It is our contention that the
responsible government,

the Marxian, and the Duverger explanations
of parties are

inadequate with regard to both the stated
and implied value

bases of the theorists, and also concerning
some aspects of

methodology utilized to explain the phenomenon
of political
party.

We have also suggested that, at the present
stage of

understanding of parties, a fruitful avenue of further
inquiry leading to the eventual goal of a general
empirical

theory of parties is to be found in an exploration of
the
functional similarities of parties.

The utilization of

functional explanations has been strongly questioned by
some philosophers of science and has been just as strongly

defended by other observers.

1

The philosophical question

raised by these conflicting epistemological and method-

ological viewpoints bears directly upon the adequacy of the
existing general explanations of parties and also upon our
as yet to be presented path for future theoretical effort.

"''Functionalism has been strongly attacked in its logical and substantive aspects by, among others, Carl C.
Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in L. Gross, ed.,
Symposium on Sociological Theory (New York: Harper & Row,
Classic functional analyses include
1959), pp. 271-307.
Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950)
and Robert K. Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure rev. ed., (New York:
The Free Press, 1957).
,

,

,

,
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The two philosophical aspects of greatest
concern to
our analysis of general party explanations
are the epis-

temological question of the nature of social
reality, and
feasible approaches to an understanding of this
reality.

Our exploration of these two concerns serves the
dual purpose of demonstrating additional weaknesses in the
existing

explanations of party and of laying the groundwork for our

justification of our proposed methodological approach to

general party theory.
ophical weaknesses

a

We will here discuss the philos-

of existing general party explanations

and in the following chapter will defend

a

functional ex-

planation of selected dimensions of the phenomenon political
party as a necessary step in the generation of an empirical
party theory.

Epistemological Considerations

The observer who is interested in the generation of

valid explanations must address himself to the question of

what sort of data is adequate to support his theoretical
construct.

The philosophers of science are divided into

two groups on this question, the positivists and the neo-

I

idealists.

2
'
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The epistemological question of
the nature of

the observer's conception of social
reality determines to

which of these two groups he belongs.

The positivists:

contend that prediction is the key
criterion
for adequate explanation, that the adequacy
of one's
data relative to one's hypotheses or theory
lies in
the resulting ability to predict patterns
in a
given realm. Opposed to this group are
sociologists
who see understanding as the basis for adequate explanation.
.

.

.

.

.

.

That valid understanding and prediction are not
the same is

clearly demonstrated by the capacity of observers in
past
ages to accurately predict solar eclipses based upon
their

conceptualization of a geocentric universe.
The positivist position on the question of knowledge
of social reality is that there are no fundamental differ-

ences between physical and social phenomena and that the

methodology utilized to explain the former

is also applicable

to the explanation of the phenomena of social science.

Ob-

servers of this persuasion are thus prone to maintain that
the most acceptable, if not the only allowable methodology
2

Various labels are attached to these different points
of view. The Positivists are also referred to as empiricists
and logico-empiricists while neo-idealists are also called
intuitionists (Runciman) and sub jectivists (Frohock)
See
Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social
Research
(New York:
Harper & Row, 1968), especially Chapter
11, W. G. Runciman, Social Science & Political Theory
(London:
Cambridge University Press, 1963), and Fred M. Frohock, The
Nature of Political Inquiry
(Homewood, 111.:
The Dorsey
,

.

,

,

,

Press,
3

1967).

Sjoberg and Nett, pp. 288-289.

82

to explain social man, is the
logico-deductive approach.

This approach, in its ideal manifestation,
discovers valid

universal generalizations or covering laws
and from these
deduces the applicability of the generalization
to specific

occurrences of it.

The social order is perceived as being

mechanistic to the degree that the actions of men,
singly
or in groups, are governed by laws which,

if they are not

constant, change so slowly that long range valid generali-

zations are possible.

The methodology of this approach to

explanation has been summarized as:
explanations require the adducing of general
.
.
laws, with the status of empirical hypotheses about
the natural order, from which, in conjunction with
statements of initial conditions, we can deduc.

tively irjfer statements about empirical consequences
.

This has been a widely accepted methodological approach to
the explanation of social science phenomena since its clear

elucidation by John Stuart Mill. 5

Its acceptability is

currently defended by philosophers of science such as Nagel 6
and Braithwaite. 7

Within the study of Politics and Government

4

Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences
The Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 46.

,

(London:
5

Mill, A System of Logic

,

(London,

1879)

Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in
the Logic of Scientific Explanation
(New York:
Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1961).
,

7

York:

Richard B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation
Harper & Brothers, 1960)

,

(New
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its most vocal

defender is Eugene

J.

Meehan. 8

These ob-

servers defend the unity of explanation
under the rubric of

THE Scientific Method.

This method is held to be applicable

to the explanation of both physical and
social phenomena.

The Scientific Method

The deductivist social scientist who strives to
explain

political phenomena envies the physical science observers

because in the latter area prediction is much more advanced
than in other fields of inquiry.

The success of physical

science inquiry is in no small measure due to the use of

what is called the "scientific method" of inquiry.
This method should not be equated with the field of

knowledge itself though.

As will be argued below, the

subject matter with which the physical sciences deal

is

much

more conducive at the present stage of knowledge to the

application of the logico-deductive mode of inquiry than

thinking man

— the

is

subject matter of the social scientist.

As stated by Ernest Nagel:
It is the desire for explanations which are at
once systematic and controllable by factual evidence that generates science; and it is the organization and classification of knowledge on the

8

Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965.)

,

basis of explanatory principles
that is the distinctive goal of the sciences. 9
He goes on to say that the scientist
seeks to formulate

general conditions under which events
occur and to make
statements concerning these conditions as
the explanations
of the observed happenings.

in generalizing about the ob-

served events, the making of statements
concerning their

alleged causality, the observer is engaged in
scientific
inquiry to the extent that he seeks to "establish
some

relation of dependence between apparently miscellaneous
items of information.

.

." 10

To Nagel this is the heart

of scientific inquiry.

Man seeks knowledge of the phenomena surrounding him,
and to this end he observes what occurs and inquires con-

cerning the observations which he, and others, have made.
The goal of his inquiry is explanation of the phenomena

observed.
The kinds of explanations that are considered
desirable or possible in a discipline will help
determine the approach to the subject matter, the
phenomena selected for investigation, the information sought, the manner in which the data are
treated and the jerif ication procedures employed
in the inquiry.
Q

^Ernest Nagel.
Ibid

,

p.

5.

"^Meehan, p. 88.
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If we remain within the bounds of
formal logic, explanations

of occurrences in the field of physical
science are more

powerful than those of the social sciences in the
sense that

predictability is more common in many instances.

Predict-

ability suggests repetition of at least some attributes
of
the phenomenon to be explained.

Thus, some degree of reg-

ularity or duplication of at least a few aspects of the
observables is necessary if the phenomenon selected for ex-

planation is to be explained according to the logical requirements of the ideal scientific method of the physical
sciences.

At the heart of this method is the generali-

zation.

When a science is highly developed, its generalizations can be summarized into a terse code;
that is, a set of statements so arranged that a
few major ideas serve as. premises from which all
other propositions or hypotheses will follow.
In
an immature science the principles may do little
more than define and classify characteristics,
thus setting the staje for the future development
of a deductive code.
The explanatory power of a valid generalization is perhaps

best exemplified by Newtonian physics where the concept
gravity, the mutual force of attraction between any two

bodies, explains an apple falling to the ground and the

movement of the planets around the sun.

Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith,
An Introduction to Political
eds. Politics and Social Life:
Behavior
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 68-69.
,

,
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Deductive Reasoning and Social Scj^nc^ s
Deductive reasoning is based upon a general
statement
or generalization.

A generalization attributes:

particular properties to some or all of the
members of a well defined, nonvacuous class and thus
provide (s) a link among members of that class.
Clearly, the ability to generalize is in some degree
contingent on the nature of the subject matter; some
objects are more easily drawn into general statements than others. 3
.

.

.

Deductive reasoning requires universal generalizations
as a starting point and as previously stated, universal

generalizations relevant to the subject matter of interest
to social scientists are almost,

if not totally impossible

at the current stage of development of the social sciences.

Thus it would appear that for the present, from the logico-

deductive perspective, the tool of deductive reasoning as

a

method of explanation is unavailable to social science.
Meehan has outlined five reasons why, on the practical
level, political science is unable to make use of deductive

reasoning.

They are:

matter;

the difficulty of conducting controlled ex-

(2)

periments;

(3)

his behavior;

(1)

the human capacity to learn and thus to alter
(4)

the tendency of generalizations to be

culture-conditioned; and
13

the complexity of the subject

Meehan, p. 91.

(5)

the influence of personal
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values of the individual observer. 14

The phenomena and the

environment in which they occur thus
would appear to rule
out of political analysis and theory
building the use of

rigid logical deduction.

A possible way to surmount this alleged
barrier will be
suggested in this thesis.

For the present our remarks will

be confined within the limits normally used
to restrict the
conduct of social science inquiry.

With deductive reasoning held unattainable by some
positivists, the social scientist is thus forced, according
to the logico-deductivists, to use probabilistic or
tendency

generalizations and inductive reasoning.

When the premises do not suffice to imply
the conclusion but nevertheless have some weight
as evidence in favor of it, the argument is said
to be inductive.
Inductive reasoning based upon tendency statements:

provide (s) evidence, not deductive proof for
a particular proposition.
A more serious shortcoming of tendency statements, however, is that
they impose no predetermined limit on the evidence;
they are exceptionally difficult to verify, for
verification is an act of judgment not the application of a criterion. Taken alone a single
tendency statement is almost useless; it must be
bound with other statements into a coherent theory
.

.

.

—

14
15

rev.,

Ibid.

,

pp.

105-109.

Susan Stabbing, A Modern Elementary Logic 5th
(London:
Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1952), p. 5.

L.

,

ed,
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before it acquires significant
explanatory
J
D
power.

The Epistemology of Marx and Duverg gr
The explanations of the social phenomenon
political

party of Karl Marx and Maurice Duverger are
in the positvist
or logico-deductivist tradition.

These two explanations

are based upon the same epistemological
foundations and

demonstrate both the strengths and the weaknesses
of the
logico-deductivist approach to the generation of theoretical
explanations in the social sciences.
The positivistic orientation of Marx is clearly
shown
in his emphasis upon the unity of methodology of
both phys-

ical and social science.

His proposed dialectical method

of inquiry and explanation incorporates a blending of
both

epistemological and methodological elements and leads to

what he called "objective" or "scientific truth"— an eventual
absolute truth applicable to the explanation of all natural
phenomena
natural science will in time incorporate the
science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate natural science: There will be one
science
.

.

.

l6
Meehan, pp. 115-116.
17'Karl Marx,

"Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of
1844," as quoted in Marx-Engels, Selected Works II p. 153.
,
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A contemporary student of Soviet Russian
thought contends
that the position is yet viable in Russian
scholarship.

The

methodology of the dialectic will enable social
scientists
to both explain and predict the future course
of human

events.

This source states that:

In the judgment of Soviet writers, the Marxist
dialectical method is not merely a scientific
method in the strict meaning of the term.
in add-

ition to being the ultimate method for studying
social phenomena, it represents at the same time
a most advanced theory of cognition, a most progressive political ideology, a method for the revolutionary transformation of old social orders into
new ones, a method for the conduct of domestic and
international policies, and finally a method for
foreseeing and predicting the future. 18
Thus, to Marx and to modern Marxists, the unity of natural

phenomena is a reality and the same explanatory process, the
dialectic,

is applicable to both of its divisions,

the

physical and social elements.
If the criterion of an acceptable scientific explanation
is its predictive capacity,

then the Marxian explanation of

the phenomenon political party has a rather strong claim as
.

.

to its utility.

18

ology

,

19

19

However, this assessment does not

Michael Jaworskyj, Soviet Political Thought: An Anth(Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 3.

From the methodological perspective we are not making
the assessment in the Marxian dialectical sense. Our emphasis here is upon the alleged empirical ("scientific") but
in fact normative generalizations upon which the whole
Marxian explanatory edifice is constructed.
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recognize the normative foundation
upon which the Marxian

explanation rests.

Unless one accepts specific value
judg-

ments with regard to the transitive
worth of various modes
of social organization and the
concomitant evolutionary

perspective with respect to social change,
the explanation
has little claim to the status of a
general theory of

parties
The explanatory framework of Duverger is also
positivistic in that he is dedicated to a unitary scientific
ex-

planation for all natural phenomena.
The first aim of science is to formulate laws
which describe constant relations between phenomena.
These laws.
make possible the prediction of the
phenomenon "N" when phenomenon "A" is present.
In practice the discovery of laws is possible only
in the most advanced sectors of research:
there are
still few such sectors in the social sciences. 20
.

.

Duverger thus suggests that the explanation of all natural
phenomena can be accomplished via the same methodology and
that the "retarded" level of explanation in the social

sciences is a consequence, not of the inapplicability of

physical science methodology alone, to social phenomena,
but primarily because of a far greater number of independent
and intervening variables which affect the dependent variable
in a social science explanation.

Once the barriers of

Maurice Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences
with Special Reference to Their Methods trans, by Malcolm
Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 226.
,

91

of variable identification and
quantification have been

surmounted then prediction

is

possible.

To Duverger, pre-

diction is synonymous with explanation
In principle the level of
explanation is also
that of prediction.
all sciences, however
prediction runs into a certain number of
difficulties and these are serious in the
social sciences. 21
.

.

m

The Duverger explanation of parties does
not rest firmly upon
an obviously explicit value foundation
except for a general

implication that parties are a good thing, so
a critique of
its empirical validity is inappropriate.

However,

it does

demonstrate a serious weakness which is a result of the

evaluatory emphasis placed upon prediction within

a scien-

tific explanatory framework of methodological unity.

Many

observers deny this unity of method in explanation of nat-

ural phenomena and propose a different approach to explanation when the object of explanation is human.

The epis-

temological weakness of the Duverger attempt to explain political parties is contained in, and demonstrated by, the

intuitionist or subjectivist critique of positivist philosophy.
21

a
Ibid.
,

.

,

pp.

227-228.
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Meaning and Social ArHnn

The proponents and supporters of
the subjectivist epis-

temology allege that the physical and the
social sciences
are distinct bodies of knowledge 22 and
that these differences

arise because of the different nature of
the phenomena to

be explained.

prediction

To these observers, understanding rather
than

is the criterion of an adequate
explanation of a

social, as distinct from a physical science
phenomenon.

The

subjectivists hold that in order to generate an acceptable

explanation of phenomena which contain a human element, the

observer must be cognizant of both the historical dimensions
and of the subjective aspects of human behavior.

Unlike

the physical scientist, the social theorist is able, and

must "get inside" his subject matter in order to include in
his explanation the subject's perception of reality

ideology or frame of reference. 23

— his

The capacity of the ob-

ject of explanation to engage in perception, cognition and
to make value judgments suggests to the subjectivists that

prediction is a very incomplete standard by which to judge
the validity and completeness of explanations.

It is argued

22

Leading examples of this position are Max Weber and
Talcott Parsons.
23

In the terminology of perhaps the foremost intuitionist
the subject's "definition of the situation," Talcott Parsons
and Edward Shils, eds
Toward A General Theory of Action
Harvard University Press, 1951).
(Cambridge:
.

,

,
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that this non-mechanistic view
of the social universe re-

quires that proposed explanations
demonstrate an "under-

standing" of the subjective dimensions
of human thought and

action because of man's active role in
the shaping of his
environment.

In this view, an adequate explanation
of the

human action of placing a name on

a

piece of paper requires

the observer to know whether the marks on
the paper repre-

sent a legitimization of a death warrant or an
act of

judicial clemency.
Thus,

in contrast to the logical empiricists,

such as

Duverger, the intuitionists contend that a valid explanation
of social phenomena consists of more than a painstaking

and narrow gauge search for an exhaustive list of all pos-

sible influencing variables by means of outside observation.

Such a methodology can be quite successful in the delineation of structural and historical influences upon the

phenomenon to be explained 24 but its weakness in social
science is that such a restricted methodology does not lead
to a systematic search for the subjective variables which

are indispensable for an explanation which includes both the

necessary and the sufficient conditions or variables.

Thus,

the Duverger explanation of political parties is a partial

^^Duverger s Political Parties: Their Origins and Activity in the Modern State is an excellent example of this
logico-deductive methodology.
1
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explanation and the author claimed
no more than this status
for his efforts.

But,

in addition, his positivistic
epis-

temology and methodology, while adequate
for explanation of
the dimensions of the phenomenon which
he chose to explore,

are not adequate for the search for the
remaining (sufficient?) variables which a general empirical
theory of parties

must contain.

Epistem olocrv of the Responsible Party Theory
The philosophical foundation of the mandate or respon-

sible government explanation of parties, as exemplified
by

Woodrow V7ilson, suggests no clear and consistent position
on the epistemological question of the nature of the subject

matter to be explained.

Wilson demonstrates that he

is not

a positivist:

do not like the term political science.
Human relationships whether in the family or in the
state, in the counting house or in the factory, are
not in any proper sense the subject matter of
science.
They are the stuff of insight and symI

pathy and spiritual comprehension. 25
This passage appears to place Wilson in the intuitionist
tradition.

But the type of explanation of political parties

?5

Wilson, "The Law and the Facts," American Political
Science Review #5, (1911) pp. 1-11, as quoted in David
Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of
Political Science 2nd ed.
(New York:
Alfred A. Knopf,
,

,

,

1971), pp.

67-68.

,
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which he offers shows that the dominant
thrust of his theoretical work is descriptive and prescriptive.

As we have

suggested above, the domination of normative
values in an

explanatory framework is counter productive to the
generation of empirical theory.

This weakness is particularly

evident both in the Marxian and in Wilson's explanations
of
parties
The reformative coloration of the mandate theorists

continues down to the present era, as the work of the American Political Science Association committee demonstrates. 26

The task of the development of empirical party theory is not

advanced but is inhibited by the weaknesses of both epistemology and methodology exhibited in both the Marxian and
responsible government explanations of political parties.

Duverger and Marx share the same epistemological orientation to the extent that the subjective element of human

development is not emphasized by either observer.

For Marx,

human potentiality is determined by objective conditions of
the material environment.

Duverger, by his emphasis upon

the structures of political parties rather than more

a More Responsible Two-Party System," American
For
Review Supplement, (September, 1950)
Science
Political
The
a recent study see Bernard S. Broder, The Partys Over:
Row,
1971)
Harper
&
(New
York:
America
Failure of Politics in
Also worthwhile is James M. Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), Chapters
9, 10, and 14.

^"Toward

.

,

,

,
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subjective party elements, chooses
to explain that aspect of
the phenomenon party which falls
within what he calls "mat-

erially objective facts." 27

Thus Marx explains nQt Qnly

political parties, but the all-inclusive
phenomenon social
man from an epistemological position
which he shares with
Duverger.

This position is that of a unity
of natural and

social explanation.

Marx and Duverger differ in that Marx does
not recognize the basic value position which undergirds
his epis-

temological approach to explanation, while Duverger

is

aware of values and constructs his explanation
so that the

subjective dimensions of the phenomenon are excluded.

Thus

Marx gives us a general but value-based explanation of
parties and Duverger, while avoiding this trap, presents
us

with a value neutral but partial party explanatory framework.

Woodrow Wilson is aware of the subjective dimension

of human existence but his party theory is at least as value

based as that of Marx.

He recognizes that human values must

27 Duverger

states that "... certain social facts are
only images and have no existence outside consciousness.
Others, in contrast have existences external to consciousness
and are also something else as well as images. These can be
called 'materially objective facts.'" He then gives as an
example of a materially objective fact, "... the structure
of parties or pressure groups.
."
An Introduction to the
Social Sciences.
28-29.
pp.
.

.

.

,

be taken into account in
the
n exnbn.f
ex Planation of social
phenomena
but his explanation
o
of political
nolit-i^i parties
« ^
is rendered almost
useless by his failure to
recocm-i^ the introduction
*
xccognize
of his
own personal value system.
This weakness is endemic
to most
of the defenders of this
approach to party explanation.
•

,•

4.

It is our contention that
if general empirical explan-

ations of human activity patterns
are possible and will
eventually be developed, such
explanations will be deductive
in nature.

The arduous task of attaining
this goal will

require the utilization of preliminary
explanatory frameworks which demonstrate an awareness
of the subjective
dimensions of man.

Thus, further work in the development

of a general theory of political
parties must bridge the

epistemological and methodological gap between
the positivists and the sub jectivists

.

Neither the Marxian nor the

Responsible Government explanations of parties
are adequate
vehicles for this advance, the former because of the
overt
value position of its supporters and defenders.

The pos-

itivistic claims of Karl Marx are somewhat obscured

by-

his

emphasis upon the methodology of the dialectic rather than

logico-deductivism but a basic premise of his general social
explanation is that capitalism is theft and as Riker has
demonstrated, when the concept theft is removed from the

context of a specific legal
system
then
y own, tnen
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itit.

hp
becomes
a norm-

ative idea. 28
The politicaX party explanation
of Duverger Is a step
in the right direction in
that he is aware of the
existence
of the subjectivist position,
but his efforts at explanation
are restricted to those
organizational and structural aspects of parties where participant
values are least in
evidence.

it is our contention that
through the develop-

ment of a functional model of
parties, the epistemological
positivist-lntuitionist gulf can be bridged
and the search
for a general and empirical party
theory be advanced.

We now turn to an examination of the
feasibility of

presenting a functional model as a vehicle
for the eventual
development of empirical theory.

William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962), p. 5.

.
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POLITICAL PARTY EXPLANATION
SOME PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS
It is our contention
that general empirical
explanations

of human activity are at
least theoretically
possible.
it
is further contended
that the logico-deductive
approaches
to a general party explanation
of Karl Marx and Maurice

Duverger are weak in their
explanatory power, the former
because of its basic value
assumption with regard to the
author's ethical judgment on the
ownership of property, and
the latter because of Duverger
s choosing to ignore the
subjective dimension of human activity.

m

addition, in our

opinion, the use of the logico-deductive
methodology by these

two observers, is premature.

The responsible government

explanation of party is the weakest of the
three theories
because, as formulated by Woodrow Wilson,
this explanation

recognizes subjectivism but is so permeated with
Western

political values such as rationality and political
participation as to render it

a

historically unique and narrow

gauge attempt to explain the phenomenon political
party.

Recent observers on parties have continued to reflect
this

narrow Western bias.

At the present level of knowledge of political parties,
the pressing task in the search for a general explanation is

the rdentification and, if
possible/ quantif ication
Qf§
many as possible of the
multiplicity of variables
which
influence the choice of individual
actions by the human
actor. When this task is
complete or perhaps near to
completion we should then be able
to describe the necessary
and sufficient conditions which
generate a human activity
pattern. As we approach the
possession of a full inventory
of these variables, the utilization
of the powerful explanatory tool of logico-deductivism
will become available to

^

the social theorist/ but at the
present immature stage of

explanation in the social sciences,
our energies should be
directed primarily toward the search
for the unknown,

elusive, and for the most part subjective,
variables.

The partial party explanation of Duverger
emphasizes

the structure of parties and party systems,
and because of
this emphasis the explanatory power of the
Duverger formu-

lation advances our knowledge of the phenomenon
to some
degree.

This advance is made in spite of Duverger

'

s

pre-

mature commitment to the logico-deductive explanatory
framework and thus his lack of emphasis upon the subjective
1

It appears possible that this stage in the development
of explanations in social science will be reached when we
can begin to develop a valid inventory of "sufficient" variables to explain the occurrences of specific social phenomena
.

dimension of social man.

Xt is our contention

^^
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dimension can be explored and
clarified through the generation and development of a
functionally based analytical
theory or heuristic framework
which will enable us to identify additional independent
variables and thus further
explore new dimensions of those
specific repetitive action
patterns which we have called
political parties. 2

DMinition an d Heuristic Mod el Expiation
It is our contention that the
following strategy should

be utilized in the search for a
general theory of political
parties.

First, the reality to be explained,
the dependent

variable, should be empirically defined
so as to

(a)

clearly

demonstrate its uniqueness from all other
phenomena, and
(b)

the observer should describe shared
characteristics of

all instances of occurrence of the
phenomenon so as to

warrant including specific instances or
occurrences of the
phenomenon within

a

single terminological designation.

The word "action" is used here in the sense that
Talcott
Parsons uses it. According to Parsons an "action"
is restricted to goal-directed or meaningful choices on the
part of
the individual. Parsons excludes from this concept
such
human activities as the activation of reflexes. Parsonian
conceptualizations have gone through many formulations. This
"social action" concept is perhaps most clearly developed in
The Structure of Social Actio n. (New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, 1949), and The Social System
(Glencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press, 1951)
.
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The next step is then to
search for independent variables, both the necessary
and sufficient conditions,
so as
to be able to account for
the dependent variable.
In physical science explanations this
step can usually utilize
the

logico-deductive approach in the use
of quantified data,
in the social sciences we
must often utilize additional
explanatory devices such as heuristic
models to enable us
to unearth previously ignored,
or yet to be discovered

independent variables.

These models are especially
valuable

when the dependent variable

is

some dimension of subjective

human activity patterns.

When using such models, the criterion
of acceptability
is not necessarily empirical refutation
if the model allows

us to discover previously unknown or
unrecognized independent

variables, the consequences of which can be, at
least in
theory, empirically tested for their validity.

In addition,

such heuristic models can disclose new linkages
between

existing known variables.
Our immediate task then is to empirically define the

social phenomenon political party and then to attempt to

discover some of the independent variables related to the
subjective nature of man so as to further our search for
a

general explanation of political parties.

This will be

attempted through the use of an analytical structural-
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functional model of individual
party-related activity called
S ocial Satisfaction
LevelHodel of individual party-related
J
activity. Through the generation
of such a model we can hopefully spotlight previously neglected
porcess-related variables
which have a bearing upon an eventual
general explanation of
parties, both in their structural and
procedural aspects.

Our

emphasis here is upon the motivations
of the individual who is

active in a political party, the party seen
as a social structure by means of which the individual is
able to realize at
least some of his action-directed goals.

The party is thus

functional to the individual as a means by which he

is able

to increase his personal life-satisfaction level.

Functionalism and Explanation
The utilization of a functionally based explanatory

framework is an approach which is fraught with pitfalls,

both epistemological and methodological.

Many philosophers

of science have raised objections to the claim that this

approach to explanation can further our understanding of
social phenomena.

The claim is often made that no

3

Such objections are most often raised by those philosophers of science who are defending the positivist path
to explanation.
See, for example, Carl G. Hempel, "The
Logic of Functional Analysis" in Llewellyn Gross, ed.
Symposium on Sociological Theory (New York: Harper & Row,
1959), pp. 271-307. Another positivist critics is R. Dowse,
,

"A

functionalist explanation is Dn q^w Q u
possible which is not
teleological in nature-that is
•

.

^

that an
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or discovered by the researcher
to which the action
to be
explained then becomes
supportive or functional.
Thus, some
oritics allege: no teleology,
no functional explanation,
in addition, some social
theorists have challenged
the claim
of functionalists that their
explanatory approach is unique.*
This allegation must be
recognized if a useful application
of

functionalism is to be brought to
bear upon social phenomena
explanation. A third criticism
of the use of functional
explanations is contained within the
holist/individualist

controversy which revolves around
the question of the basic
unit of social analysis.

Functionalist Logic," World Politics,
(July, 1966), pp. 607in his critique of Gabriel A.
622.
Almond's use of functionalism, the main criticism of Dowse
is that Almond is not
presenting a theory as he is alleged to
be claiming-Dowse
holds that Almond's work is not subject
to refutation.
However, Dowse concedes that "
structural-functionalism)
has sensitized students to complex
relationships, has'drawn
attention to the social setting of politics,
and has proved
a valuable corrective to rationalizing
and moralizing."
it is for these purposes that we, as
(p. 618).
did Almond
are using a functional explanatory
framework.
(

4 See,

for example, Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology
and Anthro-

pology, " American Sociological Review Vol.
24, (Dec., 1959),
The argument here is that functional explanpp. 757-772.
ations are only a subset of the widely utilized causal
chain
explanatory framework.
.

These criti cisms contain
varying degrees

but their durability demands

fchat

Qbserver

^

^ ^^^^

the functionalist explanatory
tool clearly present and
justify his conception as
to how the functional
approach to
social explanation furthers
understanding of social phencnena
and, in addition, clearly
demonstrate that the valid criticisms of this approach have
been recognized and surmounted.

Functionalism and Individual! sm
The suggestion that an observer
is utilizing a functionalism mode of explanation immediately
embroils him in
the individualistic critique of
this explanatory framework.
Critics of this approach allege
that the only viable social

unit which is empirically explainable
is the human individual and that it is logically indefensible
to ascribe pur-

poses or end-states to a social
collectivity.

5

Opponents of

this viewpoint maintain that a social
collectivity often pos-

sesses

5

characteristics which disappear when the whole

is

The most extreme point of this position
is that of
Karl Popper, Th e Open Society and Its Enemies
and The Poverty
of—Historicism, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964)
Popper
argues that the holistic approach to social
explanation paves
the way for general public acceptance of
collectivist social
philosophies such as communism and fascism.
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broken down into its basic human
units. .«

The development

of a "mob psychology" is often
cited by holists as an example of a collectivist property
which disappears when the

group is dispersed by a show of
force.

The individualists

such as Popper and George Homans 7
appear to ignore the point
that in the search for regularities
in human actions, social
observers are continuously utilizing
an analytical fiction,
the typical individual rather than
the unique. 8

Thus the

observer is seeking common social
properties or characteristics and the holist- individualist debate
becomes a non-

starter

Are We All Functionalists? 9

Some social scientists have alleged that
the func-

tionalist mode of explanation is pervasive in
both physical
and social explanation because functionalism is
in reality
6

Although modern sociological studies are usually
grounded upon this assumption, the classical statement
of
this position is Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study
in
Sociology, (New York: The Free Press, 1951; originally
published in France in 1897)
7

Social Behavior:
Its Elementary Forms
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), and Popper.
.

Q

(New York:

This point is well developed in Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences
(London:
Macmillan and
Company, 1970), Chapter 8.
.

9

See Kingsley Davis.
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particular type
ot causal
causal ovvo
YP of
explanation of the, "if
function
•X', then functioning
system -y- exists," variety. 10
This

a

Position is not tenable in social
science explanation because social systems are not
empirical observables but are
analytical constructs which are
created to emphasize interrelationships between and among
independent variables.

The

analytical definition of a system
includes the functions
which sustain it and thus the
chronological separation or
temporal space between cause

'X'

and resultant

of a

'Y'

typical causal explanation does not
obtain in functional
explanations.

The heart of a functional explanation
is the

simultaneous occurrence of both

'X'

and

1

Y

1

.

Thus,

in

positing that all explanations of social
science phenomena
are types of functional explanations,
observers such as

Davis and Nagel 11 are missing the point
of temporal space.

Functionalism and Teleology

A third criticism of the functionalist mode
of explanation is the allegation by critics that those
who utilize
10

Fred M. Frohock, The Nature of Political Inquiry
Illinois:
The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 59-101.
.

(Homewood,
11_

Ernest Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation
in the Social Sciences," Language and Human Rights American
Philosophical Association, (Philadelphia, Penn.
University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), pp. 45-64.
,

:

tUx. mode are required to
posit or i, ply purposes
or endg as
attainable goals for the system.
The question is then
raised as to the possibility
of a system having goals
even
though it is conceded that an
individual human entity can
be in possession of such
attributes. This question is

epistemologically related to the
individualist-holist controversy in that holists allege
that a social collectivity
is greater than the sum of its
individual components and

that this collectivity can in fact
possess purposes or ends

which are distinct from those of its
individual units.
Those who present the teleological
critique of func-

tional explanation are often positivists
who are committed
to the logico-deductive explanatory mode.

At the present

stage of social science explanation, what
we have described
as the variable search stage, observers
are fully justified
in the utilization of functionally oriented
heuristic frame-

works if such frameworks enable us to move to new
insights
in the discovery of independent variables.

We share with

Talcott Parsons the view that the functionalist explanatory

mode is a temporary or second-best form of explanation.
Given the present level of development in the explanation
of the phenomenon social man, the advantage of the use of
this mode is that:
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the crucial characteristic
of structuralfunctronal theory is its use
of the concept system
wxthout a complete knowledge
of the laws which
determine processes within the
system. 12
•

.

.

It is the looseness of fit
which is of advantage to us
in

our attempts to discover a more
complete inventory of the
laws of social processes.
These laws are discoverable
when
we have available a more complete
inventory of the influ-

encing variables.

What is now required

is an

empirically

based working definition of the dependent
variable, the
phenomenon for which a general explanation
will no doubt
eventually be constructed.

Toward a Definition of Political Parties
The present unorganized state of the wealth
of empirical

data available on the subject of political parties
suggests
that worthwhile inquiry into this phenomenon of political
life could proceed in the following manner.

First, the

observer should study the definitions of party which have
been proposed by competent scholars so as to arrive at a

satisfactory general definition of party.
1

Such a definition

Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), p. 483, as quoted in William C.
Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories
of Talcott Parsons
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
,

.

Inc.,

1967), p. 8.

should be inclusive enouqh
to
ro
y

smn
s P an
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^

the range of the phen-

omenon, and contain within
it similar^™
similarities of* *function which
are co-on to all parties."
This definition should
also
suggest critical variables
which, when isolated,
migh t allow
the observer to construct a
model which will yield empirically testable propositions.
Such a model
nQt be a

wm

general theory of parties but only
a step in this direction.
The structural taxonomy of
Duverger should be supplemented
by a functional approach to party
classification. The ultimate general empirical theory of
parties will, no doubt
,

contain both structural and functional
elements.

Following definition and the isolation
of the variable

(s)

for use in the model, a taxonomy of
parties which is based

upon the chosen variable is possible.

From the taxonomy the

model can then be constructed and the testable
propositions
derived.

Because of the broad diversity of entities which
label
themselves political parties, a label which spans
the
13

In the view of this observer, the structure
of any
party is primarily a reflection of the functions
which the
party is seen as the vehicle to perform. Maurice
Duverger,
* n Political Parties, suggests that
structure is the critical
influence in the determination of what is the entity called
party. Our opinion is that functional/teleological explanations of party are more fruitful than causal/genetic, if a
general party theory is to be developed because functional
similarities of parties appear to be more widespread than
causal or genetic (historical) similarities.

Ill

spectrum from the Communist
Party of the People's
Republic
of China, to the Prohibitionist
Party of the United States,
one is tempted to see, refuge
in the approach to a
definition
of party such as that used
by Rupert Emerson in his
analysis
14
of African P
political
micaj. parties.
nsrf i^q
TT
H e cites with approval the
position of Thomas Hodgkin that:
her

V^° thing

t0 be gained b

^ attempting
nrJ
a precise
definition of the term "party"
at this
point.. . For the moment it is
probably most
convenient to consider as "parties"
all political

organizations which regard themselves
as parties
and which are generally so regarded. 15

Emerson acknowledges that this
approach suffers from

a

looseness of terminology but he suggests
that this loss

is

compensated for by "inclus iveness of
coverage of African

political phenomena." 16

m

a

work in which the primary aim

is description of unique parties
or party systems,

looseness of definition is perhaps allowable.

such

However, this

avoidance of the establishment of limits for
the political
entity which is being analyzed will not result
in the development of characteristics which are common
to most if not
14

Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration
in
Africa
Political Parties and Political Development
Joseph
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds
(Princeton:
Princeton
University Press, 1966), pp. 268-269.
'

'

.

.

,

I5 ml_

Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties
Penguin African Series, 1961), pp. 15-16.
16

Rupert Emerson, p.

2 69.

.

(London:

^
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all other entitle, called
parties, in all parts
of
The development of a valid
theory or model of parties
calls
for a tighter definition
than self-designation
as such.

Basic Party Charar^ri.n cs

At the most basic level
political parties are comprised
of individuals who seek to
derive some degree
of personal

satisfaction from party membership
in return for their support of the organized entity called
a party.
Sigmund
Neumann,

in his edited book Mod ern
Political Parties

says

that "To become a party to something
always means identifi-

cation with one group and differentiation
from another.

Every party in its very essence
signifies partnership in
particular organization and separation from
others.

a

l7
.

He goes on to say that what is common
to all parties

.

(demo-

cratic, authoritarian and totalitarian),
besides partnership
in a particular organization,

and separation from others, is

participation in the decision-making process or "at
least the
attempt at, and a chance for, such mobilization
for action." 18
17

•

Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 395.
,

Ibid.
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In their definition of
mo der n political parties,

LaPalombara and Weiner state
that, in contrast to
the prenineteenth century cliques,
clubs, factions and
groups of
notables who sought to influence,
control and often to displace the authorities, modern
parties must exhibit:
(1) continuity in organizations.
(2
mani
fest and presumably permanent
organizations
at
the
local level.
(3
self-conscious determination
of leaders at both national
and local levels to
capture and to hold decision-making
power.
Cer "'
30 ™ 6 manner (for
driving
for popular support.^S3
tor
.

.

L™?

.

•

.

)

)

•

>

They define a party as:
an organization that is locally
articulated,
that interacts with and seeks to
attract the electoral support of the general public,
that plays a
direct and substantive role in
political recruitment, and that is committed to a
capture or maintenance of power, either alone or in
coalition
with others zu
.

.

.

Observers of an earlier era defined party
as a "body of

men united for promoting by their joint
endeavors, the nation a
interest upon some particular principle in
which they are all

agreed;" 21 that party is organized

opinion; or, as Benjamin

Constant wrote in 1816 that "A party is
fessing the same political doctrine."
19
20

LaPalombara and Weiner, p.
Ibid.

,

p.

a

group of men pro-

The current emphasis

6.

29.

21 Edmund Burke,
Thoughts on the Present Discontents
(World Classics, Vol. II), p. 82.

,

114

is upon the political party
as dn
f
an enHn,
™= v,
entity reaching
^
out into
•

the local communities, at least
in the psychological sense
that the masses are aware that
a regime and a political

community exist and that they must
identify with this larger
entity, the political community.

Definitional Scop

e;

In attempting to define the
concept political party,

one pitfall to be avoided is that of
linking the definition
to one particular philosophy of
government.

This narrowness

appears in the LaPalorabara and Weiner
definition when the
authors speak of the party as seeking
"electoral support."
The support of the masses does not necessarily
have to be of
the electoral variety in which there is a
choice of power

holders.

In some non-democratic political communities
the

vote may be of a plebiscitar ian nature or the
authorities

may dispense with the act of mass voting altogether.
crucial idea is that the masses recognize

a

The

particular group

of authorities as legitimate.
In the broad sense the parties are comprised of indiv-

iduals who perceive strength in numbers and who combine with

others throughout the political community so that they are
able to exert influence upon the incumbents, and to themselves occupy the positions of effective decision making in

the regime.
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The essence of party
ra rf„ is
strength through com-

bination and organization and
the primary reward
exercise of political power. 22

is the

Power and Party

The theme of power
is a recnrronf
sr
recurrent ™«
one in attempts to
define parties. Max Weber has
defined parties as:
•

1Unt Y aSSOciations for
propaganda and
La\t:^°
agxtation seeking to acquire power
in order to
realize objective aims or personal
.
advantages, or both.

^

.

.

McKenzie, in comment upon this
definition says that these
"objective aims" may be of greater
or lesser importance in
providing the basis of association and
the motive force for
the activity of

a

particular party.

But, he adds, there is

little doubt that it is the collective
pursuit of power which is of overriding
importance.
It is obvious too that during the
pursuit of power
and after it has been achieved, parties
mold and
.

.

.

For the purposes of this paper the
concepts power,
authority, influence and control will be
treated as synonyms
Some writers such as Max Weber and Harold
Lasswell have
discussed the distinctiveness of each of these
terms— others
in a more general treatment have not
attempted to differentiate.
See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power,"
Behavior al
Science, Vol. 2, #3, (July, 1957), pp. 201-215.
For the level
of discussion and analysis herein attempted,
the Dahl approach
appears adequate and is used unless otherwise stated.
23

R. T. McKenzie, "Parties, Pressure Groups and
the
British Political Process," The Political Quarterly Vol. 29.
.
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party systemT 24

Part outsi oe of the

It can be argued that
those organized groups
called

lobbies, pressure groups
and interest groups
which are
"outside the party system,"
fulfil! the established
criteria
for parties in that they
are organized groups of
individuals
who are seeking political
power and influence. The
critical

difference between pressure
groups and parties is that
pressure groups concern themselves
with obtaining outputs
from the legitimate authorities
which are favorable to their
members. They usually operate
within the framework of the
regime without attempting serious
disruptions of the stability
of the political system or
community.
Normally the members
do not wish to displace the
authorities but to influence
them.
In contrast to the narrowness of
the aims or goals of

pressure groups, parties demonstrate a
wide range of demands.
They are multi-level organizations
with an interest in be-

coming the legitimate authorities in a
political community

which has developed to the degree that
the bulk of the
masses have a least a minimal awareness
of the scope and

authority of the central decision makers.
24

Ibid.

.

p.

8

^

definiti °" ° f

P-ty

|
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of Sigmund Neumann is
inclus ve
.

enough to describe parties i„
most

political communities.
systems only.

,

if not

It is not confined

>u
fcQ

democratic

It is a functional
definition in that the

essential activities of parties
are included and the use
of
party as a means of access to
positions of political power
is emphasized.
Neumann states that political
parties are:
The articulate organization of
society's active political agents, those who
are concerned with
the control of governmental
power and who compete
for popular support with another
group or groups
holding divergent views. . . the great
whrch links social forces and ideologiesintermediary
to official
governmental institutions and relates
them to politic^ action within the larger political
community
This definition, because of its inclusive
character,
its functional orientation and its
emphasis on the power

aspect of parties, seems to this observer
to be useful in
defining, in general and inclusive terms, the
concept pol-

itical party.

The primary weakness of the definition is

that the scope and degree of "society's active
political

agents" is not stated so that it is clear what level
of

activity on behalf of the party

is

required of the individual

in order to qualify him as an active political agent.
25

.

Sigmund Neumann, p. 396.
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Members hip and Par-hy

Party membership, the degree
of identification with,
and activity in furthering the
party aims and goals is held
by Duverger to be primarily
dependent upon the formal structure of the particular party.
Thus he constructs a taxonomy
having "cadre" and "mass" parties,
parties of "community,"
"association," and "order," "direct"
and "indirect" parties. 26
He recognizes that the individual's
identification with, and
level of activity on behalf of the
party is a characteristic

peculiar to each individual, but argues
that the aims and
goals of the party determine its structure,
and that the

structure of the party strongly influences
the degree of the
individual member's active identification
with the group.

He

states that the links which bind the member
to the party are
a function of the type of membership,

"direct" or "indirect."

In parties with direct membership the degree
of individual

member participation divides those who have identified
with
the group into what Duverger calls supporters, adherents,

militants and propagandists.

These groupings "form a series

of concentric circles of ever-increasing party solidarity." 27

Maurice Duverger, Book
27 Ibid.

,

p.

61.

I,

Chapter II, pp. 61-132.

Thus, both Duv erger and
Neumann refer
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^

.

ind v duai
.

participation as an element in
the definition of
poiitical
party, Neumann makes no
attempt to he specific
and Duverger
suggests that participation,
"the Ur* which binds
dividual to the party,
cannot be measure(J

^^

^

^

^^

degree but should be regarded
as different types of
participation

Since party membership spans
the spectrum from the extreme of verbal self-identification
only, to the opposite
extreme of the total commitment
of life as required by
communist and Fascist parties, fruitful
analysis requires
that a stable criteria of party
membership be established.
To relate party membership to the
degree of participation
is a sound approach to a workable
definition in that member-

ship is a voluntary act on the part
of the individual and the
success of the party in the realization
of its aims and goals
is at least partially dependent upon
the activity level of

the membership of the organization.

Since we assume that

those who voluntarily accept membership in

a

party are

favorably disposed toward the successful realization
of the

organizational goals, it follows that mere identification

with the group,

a

psychological identification only, with no

overt physical activity on its behalf, does not constitute
28 Ibid.

active membership in
the mr
t„
party.
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c
,
Such

persons, i„ Neumann's

terms, are not "active
political agents. "29
P

Party members are those
who are active in
the affairs

the aims and goals of the
party over a sustained
period of
time. Th e Neumann definition
of political party is
accepted
as a working definition
for this paper, with the
addition
that active party membership
is comprised of active
political agents who engage in
partisan activity on a regular
basis over an extended period
of time.
terms of the
taxonomy of Duverger, our use of
the qualified definition
of Neumann includes Duverger
s "militants" and "propagandists" as party members, and
excludes "adherents" and "sup-

m

'

porters."

This differentiation is based
upon the degree of

party related activity in which the
various classifications
of party identifiers are thought
to engage.

~

e te W Milbrath in Political
Participate,
\ Get
p
wl nDo People
and Why
Involved in Polite
i^,.,
ni
McNaliy and Co., 1965), in establishing
his theoretical
framework, divides the public into two
general classes,
the activists" and the "apathetics . "
The activists are
then divided into "spectator, »
"transitional, " and "gladiatorial activists. Our definition of
party as stated
above contains as party members only
the gladiatorial activists of Milbrath.

Differences of group motivations
are crucial to a taxonomy of parties which is based
upon the party functions
of
providing a means of psychological
satisfaction for the
power instinct of the individual
party member.

if,

in order

to construct a model of parties,
this function of party is
the most basic, then we must
clearly differentiate between

political parties and other voluntary,
sub-national, power
oriented groupings of individuals
found within the polity
such as those whose efforts are
directed toward the attain-

ment of economic, military or spiritual
power.
There is in most definitions of political
party the
implied assumption that there is a boundary
of party goal

perception which separates those entities which
are oriented
toward political power from other groups
in society which

may or may not be referred to as parties.

These latter

groups may be formed for purposes of fellowship,
worship,
study, or agitation for reform, but the critical
difference

between them and true parties is that parties are
social
organizations, the individual members of which are disposed
to act to extend calculated control over a perceived
unit of

their more remote environment. 30

^^
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By this we mean

members desire to exercise
control over the actions
of others
who are not close to them in
either a physical (spatial)
or
a

functional sense:
The most widely and generally
perceived unit
of more remote environment
within which a unified
pattern of calculated control
activities operates
and exists is, in modern tixaes,
the nation-state! 31

Political parties, then, as entities,
can be differentiated
from other organized social groupings
in that parties strive
to achieve or maintain legitimate
control over the authority

apparatus of the nation-state; in short,
to exercise political power, 32 in contrast to other social
groups whose aim
is to influence segments of,

body.

or the whole of, the citizen

We are not concerned with the members'
personally

perceived ultimate ends of either parties or
interest groups
but we are making a distinction between the
instrumental ends
of the two groups which is based upon their
relation to the
30

The

concepts "remote environment" and "perceived unit"
in relation to the political process are used here
in the

sense that they have been
McDonald in his The Study
in Political Science #26,
and Co., Inc., 1955), pp.
31
32

Ibid.

,

p.

developed and explained by Neil A
of Political Parties Short Studies
(Garden City, N. Y.
Doubleday
.

:

77-88.

81.

As defined by Robert A. Dahl in Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963),
p. 50, where he refers to power as the possession of coercive
influence.

legitimate authority structure.
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Political partieg strive

control the authority structure
while the other groups
will often seek to influence
but do not strive for
open
control.
If these latter groups
cross this threshold, they
then become political parties.
Thus, the Prohibitionist
Party in the United States
cannot be realistically
termed
a party even though it is
active in the contesting of
elections on a national scale.
it does not appear to be
in a
JO

position to even hope to aspire to
control of the more
remote environment.

It uses the electoral process
as a

platform to gain publicity for the single
issue in which it
is interested.

The most realistic position to which
it can

aspire is to influence Americans, and
one of its chosen

means to accomplish this goal is through
publicity which it
gains by entering active candidates in
national and local

elections
In contrast to this group,

the Beria faction in Soviet

Russia which attempted late in 1953 to seize
control of the
formal and legitimate political apparatus of the
remote environment, was moving in the direction of becoming

itical "party."

a

pol-

Beria worked in conjunction with his top

aides of the Soviet police system and his attempt at
forcible

take-over was thwarted only at the last minute. 33
33 Alfred

pretation

,

G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System:
(New York:
Random House, 1965), p. 181.

By having

An Inter-
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as an instrumental goal the
propensity to achieve control

over the more remote environment
and by engaging in activity

toward this goal, the Beria group in
Soviet Russia became a

fledgling political "party."

This threshold between party

and other groups in society was crossed
when the plotters

believed that it was possible for them to
achieve control of
the state governing apparatus and when the
bulk of their

activities, as a group, was directed toward this
end.

Political Party Defined

In summary,

political parties are voluntary organizations

of active political agents, comprised of those who concern

themselves and who are concerned with the control of the
legitimate monopoly of coercive power which is located at
some level

(s)

in the organization of the state.

They hope

sooner or later to compete for popular support with another

group or groups with similar aims and not necessarily di-

vergent goals.

They are the great intermediary which link

or desire to link social forces and ideologies to the official

governmental institutions.

They must be locally as well as

regionally or nationally articulated or actively strive to
be,

so that the people identify with the larger community.

Parties demonstrate some continuity of stable organization.

They exhibit

a

propensity to desire the organization

1

and controX of those aspects of
life which are

125
,

by general

agreement, felt to properly lie
within the sphere Qf pQl _
itical authority; or they may wish
to enlarge Qr

^

sphere of authority.

The essence of party is a

comment

to sustained and organized group
activity to achieve the

positions of legitimate political power
which the nationstate possesses in all post-primitive
societies.

This

activity, at least in the early stages, can
be clandestine
or open depending in large part upon the nature
of the

dominant ideology or ideologies concerning the existence
of
open opposition.

The Ps ychological Dimension of Power and Party
The common characteristic of all parties is that they

relate to legitimate positions of power in the political

community such that some individuals are drawn to party
activities as an efficient means to gain control of the recognized authority structure.

Psychological studies of men

suggest that the human need for the possession and exercise
of a degree of power, influence, authority and control of
at least some of the mental and behavior capabilities of

others is almost a universal human trait.

This trait is

intimately connected with what is here suggested as the

primary function of political parties

— the

function of
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providing for the collective
ive Pursuit
cmr<?iii+- ~».
or maintenance of legitimate political power.
•

*.

Organized society then is comprised
of groups of humans
who reside in political communities
which are developed to
the extent that they are perceived
as having the capacity
to provide material benefits above
the level of subsistence

only.

in order to partake of the
material comforts which

the community has the potential to, or
does provide, the

individual must possess and exercise some degree
of power.
The political community has the monopoly of
coercive power

which it exercises in an institutional framework
which may
or may not be separate from the economy, the
other basic

power center in the community.
This need to attain

a

power position, to share in the

material benefits of society,

is

complimented by the psych-

ological composition of the individual.

Modern psychology

has identified three types of individual motivations, bio-

logical drives, emotions and social motives. 34

The biogenic

drives suggested as being shared by all men are hunger,
thirst, the need for oxygen, sex, excretion and escape from
pain.

In addition to these drives which can be satisfied

34 Ross Stagner and T. F. Karwoski,
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,

Psychology
1952), pp.

,

(New
35-69.

quickly, are the emotions.

These emotions can to a high

degree be internalized within the
individual.
The third class of motivations which
strongly influence

human actions are the social motives.

These differ from

biogenic drives and emotions in that they
involve interaction with others for goal attainment, and
the relaxation
of tensions.

The social motives are listed as security,

dominance, acquisitiveness, group identifications,
and par-

ticular values or a personal ideology.

Psychological research has shown that social motives
are not inherited but are absorbed and internalized from
the

cultural environment in which the individual has been reared,
The social values of the culture in which one develops are
at least in part responsible for the determination of social

motives, the patterns of social interaction with others

within the community.

This culture conditioning does not

detract from our suggesting the nearly universal power drive
of individuals, because the drive to power has been found to

exist in any cultural community which we have designated as

post-primitive:

those which have developed beyond the

village or tribal form of social organization.

Ibid.
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The five social motives of
security, dominance, group
identification, acquisitiveness and
particular values all
involve to a significant degree the
exercise of some amount
of power over others in the community.

Thus, the psychology

of man and the economic milieu in
which he is situated in
all present day post-primitive societies,
both point in the

direction of the attaining and the utilization
of powereconomic power by means of control over both
man and nature,
and political power by means of control over
other men.
If political power accrues to those who
successfully

seek it, and since men are mortal, it follows
that within

the authority group of the political system there is
a

constant shifting of access to various power positions.

in

addition, coalitions are recognized as being mutally beneficial.

Thus, those seeking to replace and to become the

authorities are motivated by aspirations to positions of

political power.

Access to this power

is

one means of re-

leasing tensions in the individual occurring as a result of
his acquired social motivations.

The function of political

parties is to provide a power base from which the men who
are prepared to act in concert can struggle together to

achieve or to maintain their capability to exercise political
power.

129
Thus, within the framework of
a power-based functional

approach to parties, there are
primarily differences of
timing and of method of operation
between a contest for
power in the United States and a coup
in Soviet Russia.

most democratic systems men can afford
to wait for

m

a chance

at the positions of power because of
fairly regularized and

predictable times of formal struggle while
in totalitarian
systems the aspirants must act surreptitiously
until they
feel conditions are right

to move into the open and thus

to reveal the amount of actual and potential
power they

control.

In both types of systems the functional
unit of

operation is the group bidding for power or seeking
to
retain it.
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CHAPTER
PARTY AND POWER:

VI

A DYNAMIC HEURISTIC MODE L

It has been suggested that
contemporary man,

in his

search for valid explanation of the
universe of phenomena,
stands on the shoulders of giants.

This assessment is as

correct in the generation of a general theory
of political
parties as in any other area of explanatory
endeavor.

We

have discussed epistemological and methodological
weakness
in the Marxian and the mandate/responsible
government ex-

planation of political parties and have suggested that the

work of Maurice Duverger is useful but narrow in its scope.
However,
a

further efforts directed toward the generation of

general exploration must not only be cognizant of, but

must build upon the insights into the party dimension of
social life which these scholars have provided.

A most significant contribution of Marx to the explanation of social man is his development of the conceptualization that man is a materialistically motivated entity.

Explanations of the meanings of social actions are weakened
if the economic dimension of life is ignored.

The mandate

party theorists have contributed to our understanding of
parties because of their emphasis on the assumption that man

would act in a rationally self-centered manner, within the

context of a democratic form of
government.
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By so doing he

would achieve the twin benefits
of personal self-development
and the general good of society.

1

Maurice Duverger has advanced the
explanation of political parties by his emphasis upon
variables relating to

party and party system origins and
to party and system
structure.

Thus,

if general explanations of human
social

life are possible and if such
explanations require the dis-

covery of the multiplicity of variables
which influence
social actions, then Duverger has contributed
to this dis-

covery process.

He has directed our attention to previously

ignored aspects of party origins, modes of
organization, the

interrelationship between party ideologies and party structures, and the chronological evolution of types of
parties.

His typologies of parties based upon these variables
provides
a

basis for the development of insights into the process of

party evolution.

l-An

The task of general party theorizing

early proponent of this view is John Stuart Mill.

In his Representative Government Mill takes the position that
individual growth and development requires participation in
the decision-making process; see p. 203. Modern social
theorists of a more empirical bent have, of course, drastically revised the explanation of the operation of democratic
systems.
Such observers as Joseph Schumpeter, Bernard

Berelson and Robert Dahl are representative of the "realists"
who describe, and in the case of Dahl and others of a
pluralist bent, define the elite-mass conceptualization of
modern democracy and the role which political parties play
in its operation.
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involves a building upon the insights of
our predecessors,
Marx, Wilson, Duverger and many others.
It is now incumbent upon us to describe
and develop a

suggestive means by which the search for a general
theory
of political parties can be advanced.

Our vehicle for this

advancement is a heuristic model of political man which

is

based upon specific assumptions concerning his relationship
to the distributive process in any society which is suf-

ficiently advanced technologically to generate

a

surplus of

material rewards well above the subsistence level and which
has evolved one or more ideologies so as to justify the

attempts on the part of individuals and groups to increase
their personal share of these materials, and also other de-

rived advantages such as power, privilege, and prestige.
The eventual general theory of parties will be of broad

enough explanatory power to explain all dimensions of party
life.

It will provide insights into, and generate testable

Our reference here is to what have been variously
called "solidary" and "purposive" incentives or benefits, see
Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A
Theory of Organizations," in Administrative Science Quarterly
Vol. 6, (September, 1961)
pp. 129-166, and the related concepts of "expressive" and "instrumental" activities as discussed by Peter Blau in Exchange and Power in Social Life
(New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964). See also the
general argument in Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A
McGraw-Hill
(New York:
Theory of Social Stratification
Book Company, 1966)
,

,

,

,
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hypotheses concerning the motivatiions
and activity patterns
of individual party members, and the
relationships between

party members and the non-members in
a society.

in addition,

the general explanation must account for
th e institutional

structures and processes within specifi

manifestations of

the phenomenon, the patterns of interac ion
with the society

of which the party is a part, and in the case
of dual and

multi-party systems, the structure and processes of interparty competition and co-operation.

In the case of multi-

national parties such as the various communist parties, both
international co-operation among national units, and national

difference of tactics and strategy should be explained.
Given a task of this magnitude, the objection can be raised

that any plausible explanation would be so abstract and general
as to be worthless in furthering the understanding of a specific

party, at a given point in time, within

a

unique national context.

This criticism has been made of such theorists as David
Easton and Gabriel Almond. See, for example, Eugene J.
Meehan Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study
(Homewood, Illinois:
The Dorsey Press, 1967), Chapter 3.
Meehan alleges that the functionalist approach to political
explanation can be useful if rigorously applied to specific
dimensions of politics or other aspects of social life but
the use of this approach by a general theorist such as
Easton or Almond is at best, vague, and at worst, circular.
This criticism is valid only if the methodology of explanation of both physical and social science are the same.
Because of the vast difference in degree of complexity of the
subject matter to be explained this is obviously not the case.
,

,
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One approach to overcome such criticism
is to isolate specific characteristics of social man
and to relate the emergence, growth, development and perhaps
eventual decline of

political parties to this basic characteristic.

m

this

way it is hoped that testable hypotheses
will be generated
from the emphasis upon previously ignored
variables.

An

analytical model of social evolution based upon
the distributive process is one possible avenue of
explanation.
is the one chosen here because of its
dynamism.

It

We present

one dimension of an analytical model of party dynamics
which

will point the way toward tentative answers to questions

concerning the origins and structural evolution of parties,
what parties do, how they accomplish their goals and when
they act.

The model will generate hypotheses which can be

subjected to empirical refutation in answer to such questions
as:

How can we account for the appearance of parties and

party systems?
iety?

What functions do parties perform in

a

soc-

What accounts for inter-party and inter-societal

differences between and among parties and party systems with
regard to the frequency, mode, and duration of inter-party
struggles for office?

In this model,

party is the dependent

variable. 4

"
certain assumptions concerning
the nature of

social man are posited and specific
characteristics of the
social dynamic are our independent
variables. The result
is an explanatory framework
which emphasizes the dynamic

interaction of party and society.

This approach is comp-

limentary to the static, structural
explanatory explanation
of Duverger while avoiding the highly
normative foundations
of the dynamic explanations of the
Marxist and mandate/

responsible government explanations of political
parties.

Materia l Surpluses and Social Dynamics
The general argument we will develop is
based upon the

assumption 5 that the history of post-primitive
social entities
called complex industrial societies is a dynamic
process
4 Of

course, political parties can be regarded as either
dependent or independent variables. The choice is a
function
of the perspective of the researcher in what he is
attempting
to explain of social reality.
In his discussion of political
party as a "modernizing instrument," David Apter states that
political party "form is determined by the entire sociopolitical framework of the society.
they depend upon the
grouping in the society for their membership.
In this sense
political parties are dependent variables, with society and
governmental organization, election or co-operation procedures
and the like, the independent variables." The Politics of
Modernization
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965),
181-182.
pp.
.

.

,

5

Our argument is essentially an extension of the social
stratification theory of Gerhard E. Lenski in his Power and
Privilege
We are applying basic elements of his general
theory to a specific social institution, political parties.
The dynamic element of his explanation remains basically intact in this formulation.
.
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which is dependent upon four main
factors:

the existen ce

(1)

of a national surplus over and above
needs as opposed to

wants, 6

(2)

unequal allocation of the surplus which
divides

societies into at least two main groups,
elites and nonelites,

n

(3)

the existence of

a

dominant ideology to explain

and justify the division of the surplus between
these two
groups, and

(4)

the eventual evolution of counter-ideologies

to explain and defend the possibility of changes
in the dis-

tribution of the social surplus.

Modern industrial society is presented as
of large material surpluses.

a

generator

An ideology of increased gen-

eral participation in the struggle for changes in the
surplus distribution has opened the door of political
partici-

pation to self-motivated members of the non-elite groups.
6

The difference between "needs as requirements to sustain
life (e.g., food) in contrast to "wants" as a choice of need
sation entities (e.g., beefsteak or beans) is developed by
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958)
,

7

The conceptualization of societies into elites and nonelites or masses has a long history in social explanation.
The rhetoric of normative democratic theory does not explain
away the empirical fact that in any society the few make decisions for the many, and that these decisions, however ideologically justified their results might be, tend toward a
perpetuation of the unequal allocation of the values of the
society.
For a brief, well stated discussion of attempts by
democratic theorists to resolve the tensions between democracy
and elitism, see Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic
Elitism: A Critique
(Boston:
Little Brown and Company,
,

1967)
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These group members attempt to increase
their share of the
social surplus by means of an increase
in the power and

privilege they are accorded by the remainder
of that society.
This struggle is

a

group effort to advance partisan group

interests so as to increase individual pay-offs.

Additionally, any society moves in

a

cycle of surplus

allocation from MIGHT to RIGHT to MIGHT— and the
dynamic of
this cyclical movement influences the origins,
structure

and processes of parties.

The legitimatizing ideology is

one of the powerful variables in explaining the dynamics of

societal inter-party interaction patterns.

The task then is

to amplify and defend our model and to demonstrate how this

approach to party explanation is fruitful in the discovery
of new variables having a bearing upon the origins, operation

and ideologies of parties and party systems.
should further the search for

a

Such an approach

general theory of parties by

directing our attention to hitherto unemphasized or ignored
dimensions of party existence.

Surplus Distribution and Social Evolution According to Lenski

In his general theory of social stratification,

Gerhard

Lenski has provided the student of stasiology with one avenue
to build toward an eventual general theory of political parties.
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His landmark work,

Power and^Pr,ivilege

:

A Theo ry of Social

Stratification 8 utilizes the materialistic
conception of man
of Karl Marx, and the individual
self-serving dimension of

man which the mandate party theorists
incorporated from
classical laissez-faire economists.

Through application of

his broad gauge explanation of the forces
generating a

gradual evolution of societies, to the political
dimension
of life in general, and the phenomenon political
party

specifically, we should be able to supplement the static and

structural discussion of parties of Maurice Duverger with

a

dynamic perspective to give insights into how parties emerge,
evolve and interact, with each other and internally.
In brief,

Lenski posits that the single most important

key to understanding social dynamics

is an

understanding of

how the determinations are made to distribute the surplus

material goods which any post-primitive society produces.

9

How individual man stands in relation to a social surplus
distribution process is a key variable in determination of
his social power.

Lenski adopts the definition of power

o

Gerhard E. Lenski.
9

see especially the theoretical portions of his
work, Chapters 1-4, pp. 1-93.
Ibid.

,
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of Max

Weber 10

the power is "the chance of a
man or a number

of men to realize their own will
in a communal action even

against the resistance of others who are
participating in
the action."

He then postulates that men seek
some combin-

ation of the intrinsic goals of survival,
sustenance, health,
status or prestige, creative comfort, salvation
and affection

and the instrumental goals of wealth, organized
office and

other institutionalized roles, education and
training.

In

addition, collectivities of people we call societies
also

have goals which are not necessarily congruent with
every

member of a given society.

Lenski defines these societal

goals as:
those ends toward which the more or less coordinated efforts of the whole are directed without
regard to the harm they may do to many individual
members, even the majority. 1

—

"'"

The two basic goals of any society are then suggested to be
(a)

the minimization of the rate of internal political change

through ruling class emphasis upon some combination of emphasis upon law and order, and national security, and

(b)

the

maximization of material production and the resources upon
which such production depends.
1Q From Max Weber:

H.

This latter goal can be

Essays in Sociology translated by Hans
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1946), p. 180.
11

Lenski, p. 41.

,

accomplished by means of some
combination of internal resource development and foreign
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adventures.

aUth ° r thSn PrSSents
j

ietal distribution:

he calls two laws of soc-

The first is that,

"men will share the

product of their labors to the
extent required to insure the
survival and continued productivity
of those others whose
actions are necessary or beneficial
--12
to themselves..

If a

social surplus is produced 13
which is in demand by all or
nearly all members of the society,
then the Second Law of

Distribution holds that "power will
determine the distribution
of nearly all of the surplus
possessed by a society. "I* This
second law operates if, as Lenski
contends, men are primarily

motivated by personal or partisan
group interests. 15
Lenski has avoided the many conceptual
difficulties en-

countered in the use of the concept power
by defining the
term in relation to the individual's
standing in the surplus

distribution system of the particular society
of which he
12 Ibid.

,

p.

is

44.

13 This

criterion is in fact one of the primary characteristics which distinguishes a post-primitive from
a primitive
society since the relative amount of surplus is
related to
the degree of institutional complexity.
_

14 Ibid.
15 See

p. 128 for a definition and discussion of this and
other empirical terms and analytical concepts.
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a member.

He suggests that the concepts
privilege and pres-

tige are analytically distinct from
power but that both pri-

vilege and honor or prestige are
primarily functions of
power. 16

Social power can rest upon two bases,
force and

institutionalized power.

The latter differs from the former

in that it is based upon the acceptance
of the right to

authoritatively allocate social values by groups
in

having the capacity of replace the allocators.

a

society

To Lenski,

institutionalized power is constitutional power.

He is here

referring to the legitimacy of the existing political
regime
and suggests that in any society this legitimacy is part
of
a cyclical

phenomenon of power based upon

a

cycle of force,

to legitimate power, and back to force.

The basic units of analysis in his schema are power
classes or classes, and class systems.

These elements con-

stitute the fundamental concepts of his explanation of

stratification and they, along with partisan groups, are
6While

not denying the analytical and even empirical
distinction which scholars have made among these terms, for
purposes of our party model they will be treated as synonymous
Prestige is defined as "the favorable evaluation and social
recognition that a person receives from others.
the subjective dimension of social stratification." David Popenoe,
Sociology (New York: Appleton, Century Crofts, 1970), p.
221.
Privilege refers to individual or group advantages
generally recognized by custom, habit or general social consensus.
If such recognition is codified into law the possessors of such social advantages then become an estate.
.

,

.
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herein adopted as the dynamic element
of our model of political parties.

Our framework places more emphasis
upon

partisan groups than does Lenski but the
historical sweep
and breadth of explanation are narrower since
we are con-

centrating on one dimension of social life, the
political
aspect, and upon a single component of this
dimension, the

political party.

In addition,

from the chronological per-

spective, parties are a recent phenomenon in the political

area of social life.

Partisan Groups, Power Classes and Class Systems

In his discussion of the self-seeking tendencies of

human actions, Lenski suggests that some human activity
choices are motivated by altruistic considerations but that

these are a minor segment of the whole range of human choice
patterns.

In addition, many of the choices which appear on

the surface as being altruistic are, on closer examination,
a form of exchange within the primary group

—a

system of

mutually beneficial reciprocal actions.

Many actions appear as sacrifices only when the
larger context is ignored. Seen in context, such
actions appear as parts of a mutually beneficial
system of exchange favors."*" 7
17 Lenski,

p.

28.
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Thus, what appears on the interpersonal
level to be self-

sacrificial action

is,

when seen in the societal context,

not individual self-serving but options
chosen by the in-

dividual to further his own interests through
the advocacy
of choice options of benefit to a group with
which he inter-

acts on a frequent basis. 18
a

The defining characteristic

of

partisan group is frequent and personal interaction over

range of more than one social role context.

a

Two people who

interact in a commercial transaction based upon

a

cash nexus

only, would not constitute a rudimentary partisan group.

If

the scope of the interaction is broadened to include one or

more additional dimensions of face-to-face interactions such
as the buyer and seller sharing membership in the same re-

ligious, political or other social grouping, then a partisan

group is a possibility.

A key component of the explanatory framework of Lenski
is that of classes or "power classes."

These are defined as

An aggregation of persons in a society who stand
a similar position with respect to force or some
form of institutionalized power.

in

^

18

An example of partisan group interests is Edward
Banfield's The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York:
Free Press, 1958), pp. 9-10. The pattern of extended family
interests taking priority over the general welfare of the
village is well described.
In this context the extended
family is the partisan group.
,

Lenski, p. 75.
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Thus, a power class is not an empirical
entity in the same

sense that a caste or an estate is since the
total aggregate
of a society which possess a specific level of
power in the

surplus allocation process is not

a

of any other social characteristic.

distinct group in terms
Lenski holds that "a

single individual may well be a member of half

a

dozen power

classes" because "the various forms of power are less than

perfectly correlated with one another." 20

He is thus sug-

gesting that a class is a collective of power loci in various
social institutions, each locus in which the incumbent shares
the capacity to exercise a similar level of control over the

allocation of social values.

Two important aspects of this

concept and its use in social analysis are

(1)

that defining

class in terms of power does not imply that all classes have

power

— the

expendables in an agrarian society are given as

an example of this case, and

(2)

a single

individual can be

an incumbent of a multiplicity of loci and thus of many dif-

ferent social classes.

Each of the major roles he occupies as well as
his status in the property hierarchy, influences his
choices of obtaining the things he seeks in Ij^e
and thus each places him in a specific class.
20 Ibid,

21

lb id

,

pp.

75-76.
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Each member of a societ-v
iq a
= ™,wu
iety 1S
member of various classes,
his membership and the class
being determined by such personal characteristics as age,
sex, race or ethnicity and
education.

The customs, habits, mores,
beliefs and legal

systems of his society determines
the extent to which specific class members will possess power
to influence the dis-

tributive process.

The conventional wisdom component
of the

culture of a society thus determines how
much power an aggregate of people who share a particular
characteristic
should exercise in allocating resources for
that particular
society.

Since the individuals who constitute a class
in a society can be categorized according to variables
with classes

such as children, young adults or elderly within the
age
class, or illiterate or college graduate within the educa-

tion class, an additional necessary conceptual addition to
our heuristic framework is the idea of class systems or in-

stitutional systems.

23

Lenski defines these as being

"a

hierarchy of classes ranked in terms of some single criterion" and adds that:
22

Some societies exhibit a belief in a messianic ideology
which suggests to its adherents that the whole world should
share the same belief system with regard to class influence
on the distributive process.
23

Lenski, pp. 79-82.
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As indicated previously,
each class system in
a society contains within
it all the members of
that society. Thus every member
of American society holds simultaneous
membership in some class
within the occupational property,
racial - ethnic
educational, age, and sexual class
systems. 24

Lenski maintains that the struggle
for power, privilege and
prestige occurs in a society between
and among individuals,
classes, and class systems and that
the struggles on the

levels of systems involve contests
between different prin-

ciples of distribution.

This is an important conceptual-

ization in understanding the dynamic element
of

a

society

and the element upon which our party model
is based.

We

argue that characteristics which are generated
by industrial

societies and those nations dominated by the ideologies
of
these societies have generated the social organization
we
call parties and that the study of the struggle for
power

among classes and class or institutional systems generates
fruitful insights into other dimensions of party and party

member activity patterns.
developed by Lenski

is

The theory of stratification as

applied by him to hunting and gathering

societies, simple and advanced horticultural societies, agrarian, and industrial societies.

The phenomenon party is

unique to industrial societies and to agrarian societies as
a special case,

24 lb id.

where they exist simultaneously with, and are
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exposed to the influence of the
productivity, the ideology,
and the technology of the
industrial societies.
The Rise of Political P^rf les

It is our contention that
the social phenomenon we call

political party appeared at

a

time in history when a re-

ligiously generated philosophy of
citizen individualism interacted with an explosion in the
capacity of societies to
provide material abundance.

The rise of parties then is

largely a result of the Reformation
and the Industrial Revolution.

In contrast to pre-industr ial
societies,

those

nations in the forefront of industrialization
such as England,
the United States and Germany, were the
locus of a new con-

ceptualization of the relationship between the
governors
and those who were governed.

The idea that the state was the servant of
the citizens
was generated in part by changes in the nature
of scope of

warfare— changes introduced by Napoleon Bonaparte.

At the

end of the 18th century inter-nation warfare began
to involve
the mobilization of total populations and in return
for such

participation, the reciprocal nature of citizenship became
clear to ever widening segments of some societies' populace.
Prior to the rise of pressures to expand the granting of

citizenship to greater and greater segments of the

population,

"
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most inhabitants of a society

were not

s iraul-

taneously subjected to the ravages and
sacrifices of war.

With additional war-related burdens laid
upon them, new
groups of the population were motivated
to demand

a re-

distribution of the allocation of material
benefits and thus
of power, privilege and prestige. 26

Existing stratification

systems came under increasing attack.

The development of

more rapid and efficient communications networks
and the

widespread adoption of the idea that literacy was
the right
of an ever increasing proportion of national
populations

also facilitated new challenges to dominant distribution
systems.

Another contributing factor in this trend was the

discovery and exploitation of new sources of wealth in the
Americas, Africa and Asia.

Concomitant with these trends

was the interest generated in Europeans and Americans of the

myth of the noble savage who was alleged to live in

a free

state of nature and thus totally responsible for his own wel

All these factors combined to bring into question the

fare.

25 This point is developed in Walter
Mills, Arms and Men:

A Study of American Military History
(New York:
Pitman,
1956)
For a more general treatment see Stanislaw Andrzejewsk
Mi litary Organization and Society
(London:
Routledge, 1954),
specifically Chapter 2.
,

.

.

?6

As utilized by Lenski, power is conceptualized as the
capacity to influence the distribution of the material social
surplus.
Privilege and prestige are primarily a function of
one's distribution power.
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conventional wisdoms concerning the right
and proper way to
distribute social surpluses and thus power
and prestige.

A vital element then in the evolution
of social life

is

the constant struggle between the few who
dominate the al-

location of resources process and the many
who at various

historical points in time are motivated to seek
changes in
the allocation process.

The many who have a minor share in

the value allocation process of a given society
by no means

constitute all of those who regard themselves as being
unfairly situated in the existing social power relationships.

We are here making reference only to those who seek changes
and combine with others in order to effect these changes in
the social surplus distribution patterns.

it is our con-

tention that political parties are the means which have

evolved to facilitate individual and partisan group striving
for increased power in modern industrial society.

Classes, Class Systems and Parties

While any society contains within

a

multiplicity of

class systems, a consistent pattern of stratification has

persisted,

in that one,

or at most a very few of the possible

systems, have been generally recognized as being legitimate
as dominating influences in the allocation process.

In many
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cultures, for extended periods, possession
of land and, re-

lated to it, family lineage, have been the
dominant allocating
systems.

With the advent of the Industrial Revolution,
econ-

omic systems which allocate power, privilege
and prestige

according to wealth and income first supplement, and
later
tend to supplant the older institutional justifications.

When land, lineage, religion or military might are the
dominant class systems then the political dimension of life

becomes of secondary importance.

Politics is seen primarily

as a bureaucratic and administrative class system to
sustain

existing surplus allocation patterns.

The interplay of

social forces generated by the interaction of the partici-

pation ethos and the vast increase of material goods resulted in the innovative search for new activity patterns on
the part of some people, to increase their power and privilege.

If the dominant class system (s)

in a society are

based upon ascriptive characteristics then the individual
cannot turn to standards of achievement and to class systems

where the hierarchy of power
acteristic.

is

based upon this latter char-

In an achievement culture the relative openness

of the system,

in contrast to ascriptive cultures, gives the

individual opportunities he would not have had in previous
eras.

It is our contention that,

in an industrial society

and in those agrarian societies existing in conjunction with

and influenced by them, that the
individual party member
will seek to advance himself
in the hierarchy of power

"

through the political class system
and that he will try to
accomplish this objective through
combination with others
of like mind. These combinations
are the phenomenon we
call political parties.

These differ from cliques and

factions because the appeal for support
from others is made
on a class or class system basis
rather than on a basis of

exclusive and narrower partisan group
interests.

Such ap-

peals are possible only in those societies
where three con-

ditions are present:

(1)

widespread acceptance of achieve-

ment rather than ascription as
of power,

(2)

a

basis for the distribution

actual or potential massive surpluses made

possible by industrialization and

(3)

general agreement, at

least among opinion leaders of the idea of the
nation-state
as a servant of the public at large.

Thus, a significant

change in the dynamics of the distribution of power and

privilege in societies in the industrial era has been the
increasing importance of the economic and political class
systems as a locus of power to complement, and in some in-

stances replace, the older socially based class systems.

The relative importance of the political class system in
this process is one of our key variables.
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The Political Class System

The dominant position of the
political class system in
the processes by which power, privilege
and prestige are

allocated in any post-feudal independent
society is the social characteristic which enables us
to move toward an even-

tual general explanation of political parties.

This cross-

cultural similarity of function allows the
generation of an

analytical framework which can lead to new variables
bearing
upon the phenomenon and also suggests further avenues
along

which empirical testing of additional hypotheses could
proceed.

In addition,

the concept of class and its posited

relationship to the more general concept of class system,
provides the basis for a dynamic explanatory element to

party explanation which both the Marxist and mandate theories

demonstrate but in which the static taxonomy of Maurice

Duverger is deficient.
The political class system of a polity consists of all

of the social institutions which are primarily concerned with
the authoritative allocation of the social values.
27 While

At

Lenski defines class systems as "a hierarchy of
classes ranked in terms of some single criterion," he does
not specify the criterion which defines the political class
system even though he makes extended reference to it. Lenski,
pp.

79-80.

153

different levels of economic development
this allocation
process will be challenged and/or
shared with other class
systems.

m

some societies such as Soviet Russia,
the pre-

eminent allocation role of the political
class system is

widely accepted.

In this latter situation,

struggle for allocative dominance

is

the inter-system

muted and clandestine.

It is also sporatic in contrast to
more regularized elec-

toral type contests in other systems.

For industrialized

and post-industrialized societies, it appears
that the more
the emphasis is upon the political class system
as the leg-

itimate distributive element for power, privilege
and prestige, the more that society will tend toward a
one-party

state.

This proposition is, at least theoretically, open to

empirical testing.

Contemporary examples such as China and

Russia point in this direction.

At least two other possible relationships between the
political class system and other class systems are observable.

The first is in those polities often called developing

nations.

In these situations the political class system is

dominant because of

a

felt necessity to discredit more trad-

itional class systems such as family lineage or property, 28
28

In ex-colonies there is often also a necessity to discredit the native bureaucratic elite which served the colonial power.
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and in addition, the need to
achieve a rapid absolute increase in material goods dictates
strict political control
of the economic class system.

The second national pattern
of relationships between
the political and other class
systems is found in those longtime independent nations where
vastly increased productivity
is of

relatively low actual priority.

m

much of South

America, for example, military, property
and religious class
systems either compete with the
political system or dominate
and utilize it to insure their class
system dominance singly
or in coalitions among themselves.

There are many other variables which
influence the

relative dominance of the various class systems
in a polity.

Among these are the ideology, and with it the
specific historical pattern, modal period to which the
ideology has
evolved; and the extent to which the status of
citizenship is

held by the population.

Each of these influences also af-

fects the organization, activity patterns and scope of
mem-

bership of political parties within the political class
system.

An understanding of the phenomenon party to the

point of generation of an empirical theory would require
the tracing out of the inter-connections of ideologies, econ-

omies and citizenship and in turn these influences upon pol-

itical class systems and political parties.

Such a task is
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beyond the scope of this present analysis.

Our concern here

is to sketch some of the theoretical
ranges of variance of

these variables as they bear upon power
classes and parties
in nation-state contexts.

Thus, new variables to further

eventual general party explanation may be developed.
Ideologies and Political Class Sy stems

Parties and party systems exist in specific polities

within an ideological context of single ideology, dominant
ideology, two ideologies in rough equality of competition
for dominance of influence, or a fragmented ideological en-

vironment.

Examples of these different situations are

Soviet Russia, the United States, Italy, and France during
the Fourth Republic.

One important function of ideologies

in any system of stratification is to induce members of the

society to accept as legitimate

a

of the resources of that society.

given mode of distribution
The extent to which

a

single ideology is accepted as a way to explain and justify
a specific

distribution pattern is primarily dependent upon

the degree to which concerned classes are satisfied at a

given point in time with the distributive process which is
in effect.

Counter ideologies function to generate dis-

satisfaction with the dominant distributive system.

Leaders

of dissident groups utilize these counter ideologies to

156

foment passive resistance and often
open revolt.

Party is

the mode of social organization
for such efforts.

As described by Lenski, the
"political cycle" 29 of a
specific regime is, early in its existence,
dominated by
an effort to transform a rule of might
to a rule of right
so as to increase its retained share
of the social product.

This is accomplished by use of

a

legitimatizing ideology.

The two most basic functions of the middle
classes are to

serve the new elite by articulation of the ideology,
and by
the performance of administrative tasks which
insure that
the social surplus is handed over to elite control.
as Lenski contends,

later develop.

But,

reactions by non-elites will sooner or

These can take the form of individual acts

such as thievery, crimes of violence against the elites and

individual competition for elite favor.

In addition,

col-

lective activities which are counter to elite interests may
occur.

This development, linked by Lenski to the rise of

modern mass warfare, as suggested by him:

may well have been one of the major reasons for the
extension of the franchise in the last century and
for the growing acceptance by elites of labor unions,
workingmen's political parties and all of the other
organizations designed to promote and protect the
interests of the common people. 30
29 Lenski,
30 lb id

.

,

pp.

pp.

59-72
66-67.

Thus, at a point in the political
cycle, under certain

il-

logical and productive conditions,
the social grouping

called parties arises.

One of its primary functions
is to

resist a change in the distributive
processes of that society
or if this is regarded as an unwise
course of action, then
to channel the changes so that
relative power positions are

retained as long as possible by those who
are on top of the
social structure.

These are the internally created parties

of parliamentary origin.

The reaction to this new phenomenon

on the part of those seeking distributive
system changes

through a change in class system emphasis are the
parties of

extra-parliamentary origin of Maurice Duverger. 31
to these concepts of party origins are Duverger

'

s

Related
"caucus,

branch, cell and militia units of local party organization"
and his "cadre" and "mass" concepts which refer to the social
status of the individual member, his position in the dominant
class system(s), and to the size of the local unit of the
party. 32

Thus the variables of class system competition and

ideological cycles provide a dynamic dimension to the
31 These

are the central concepts in Duverger s static
explanation of the origins of political parties. Political
Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State
trans, by Barbara and Robert North, (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. V-XXXVII.
32 lb id

'

,

Book

I,

pp.

4-202.

,

158

explanation of party origins, local
organization, and nature
of basic unit organization which
the structural frameworks
of Duverger lack.
In addition to these dimensions
of party, Duverger

discusses both the degree of participation
in party activities
of the individual member.

He suggests that this activity

can be seen as consisting of "electors,
supporters and mili-

tants." 3 3

m

addition, the quality of membership is class-

ified as that of "community, association and
order." 34

Ad-

ditional understanding of these elements of party is
furthered by the introduction of the concept of power
classes
or classes as developed by Lenski, 35 and the idea of
"citi-

zenship as a class-based political resource" developed by
T. H. Marshall. 36

it is to these elements we now turn.

Class and Distributive Systems

The concept of class or power class is defined by Lenski
as being "an aggregation of persons in a society who stand in
33

Ibid.

,

pp.

90-115.

34 Ibid.

,

pp.

116-132.

•^Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege:
Social Stratification pp. 74-79.

A Theory of

,

See his essay "Citizenship and Social Class," in Class
Citizenship and Social Development
(Garden City, N. Y.
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964).
,

,
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a

similar position with respect to force
or some specific

form of institutionalized power." 37

These persons occupy

specific class rankings in all of the class
systems of the

society of which they are a member.

in addition,

the in-

dividual will often be subject to status
inconsistency because of differing class rankings within the
various class
systems.

This is especially valid in modern industrial

societies because of the multiplicity of class systems
in
these "developed" 38 nations.

it is quite possible that this

inconsistency is the primary motivational force which pushes

men who are in the top classes in

a

class system which does

not give its leaders major access to power, to push for

a

redefinition of what constitutes the dominant class system
for that society.

Political parties serve as the institu-

tional framework for such efforts.

As Lenski suggests, this

motivation goes a long way in explaining the actions of the
intelligensia class of the educational class system whom

Karl Marx suggests will lead the proletariat in its development of a true class consciousness.
37 Lenski,

p.

3^

75.

38
JO
The term "developed"

is used here in a value neutral
sense to describe the characteristic of a society's institutional complexity. This non-normative usage is discussed
by Seymour M. Lipset in the Introduction to T. H. Marshall,
p. VIII.

39

Lenski, p. 88.
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.

One important development in modern industrial
society

is the universal nature of the class of
citizenship. 40

In earlier periods, when this resource was not
shared by all

and when there were different degrees of citizenship
such as

enfranchised, unenfranchised, resident aliens, slaves and

regime enemies, citizenship served as a basis for a very im-

portant class system.

This system dimension has mostly dis-

appeared with the developments in warfare, literacy and com-

munications which accompanied the Industrial Revolution.

Citizenship as

a

its distribution;

resource now becomes almost universal in
is no longer a class

Even though citizenship

is no

system but a class.

longer the basis for a

class system but rather is a single class phenomenon, it

continues to generate a high degree of social tension in

individual societies because of its potential as a claim
for power changes and as a vehicle for organizational attempts

to change the legitimate surplus distribution patterns

through social organization.

This is explained by Lenski

as being due to the fact that:

those (in a society) who lack other kinds of resources
together with those who, for ideological reasons,
believe in social equality, have combined to fight
for the enhancement of the value of citizenship
4Q Ibid

.

,

pp. 82-84,

428-430.
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at the expense of those resources which
generate
inequality. i

He continues by saying that the conflict
normally revolves

around the question of emphasis upon the traditional
rights
of property versus the newer rights of citizenship.

This

controversy is useful in explaining the existence of twoand multi-party systems in those nations with a
capitalistic
type of economic ideology and organization.

The emphasis

in this ideology upon individual and partisan group
compe-

tition conflicts with the egalitarian tendencies of the
values of citizenship.

Thus these societies exhibit a pat-

tern of competition which pits an economic class system

against a political class.

This type of competition is in

contrast to the competitive situation described above which
occurs in those societies such as China or Soviet Russia

where the political class system

is

dominant and the struggles

over distributive patterns are of an inter-class nature.

A

third possible competitive pattern is that which occurred

shortly after the first appearance of parties; the interclass systems struggles between the economic and the political class systems.

This inter-class system struggle also

appears present in many nations with developing economies
41
*

Ibid.

,

p.

83.
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where the commitment to socialism
does not approach totality
and where the political dimension
of the society is still
at the class system level.

m

these societies, citizenship

as a resource is beginning to be
seen by more people as a

base from which to demand re-distribution
of the social
product.

Parties are the means of social organization
to

accomplish this goal.

Many parties of Africa and Asia

appear to demonstrate this pattern of conflict
over social
rewards

A fourth type of social-political conflict

is that

be-

tween different classes which are also part of different
class systems.

This type of conflict is evident in the party

development of much of Latin America.

in these situations

the upper classes of the property class system dominate an

executive centered government while the commercial and professional classes seek power through an expanded role of
their party organizations in the legislatures. 42
Thus the rise and evolution of modern industrial society
has generated four different patterns of political struggle,

all revolving around the nature of the distributive system

and the institutional means, political parties, by which the
status quo is protected, and change is pushed for.
42 See

These

the article by Robert E. Scott, "Political Parties
and Policy-making in Latin America" in Joseph LaPalombara and
Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 331-367.
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four patterns are

(1)

inter-class system conflict,

class conflicts within a single
class system,

tem versus class conflicts, and

(4)

(3)

(2)

inter-

class sys-

class versus class con-

flicts of an inter class system variety.

This simple class-

ification scheme allows us to generate a
cross-national,

ideological and cultural perspective on parties,
a perspective

which is lacking in the Marxian and mandate
explanations.
PjL^Y_Pa3:ti cipation and Memb ership

In his analysis of individual party member degree
of

participation (militant, members and supporters) and the
quality of membership (community, association and order)
Duvorger provides a static taxonomy.

By linking these con-

cepts to the ideas of single, dominant, dual competetive,

and fragmented ideologies, and the Lenski insight concerning
the legitimizing cycle of might-right-might.

.

.

,

it should

be possible to generate heuristic insights and eventually
testable hypotheses bearing upon the individual party member's perceptions and activities, and his degree of personal

attachment to the party.

This is possible because of the

imposition of the dynamism of intra-soc ietal group competition
over the nature and/or extent of the distributive system for
that particular society.

It is perhaps in this area of

164

inquiry that some of the most fruitful
efforts toward a
general theory of political parties
might proceed.

TheJJ^mamlcs of Political Development

An example of the utility of our approach

is

in the

area of political development 43 as this
term applies to the

relationship of parties to the broader social
processes of
modernization. 44

As LaPalombara and Weiner suggest, 45
any

polity, as it evolves from traditional to
more developed

governmental forms, passes through crises of
legitimacy,
integration and participation.

These political crises are

in turn related to questions of distribution
of material

wealth.

Mass externally created parties ideologically
committed to a greater satisfaction of distributive
demands continue to exert magnetic attraction for
millions of voters. On the other side, forces
unwilling to accede to distributive demands tend to
protect what power they have be recommending the
suppression of opposition parties. 46
43 See

the excellent cross polity study of Joseph LaPolombara
and Myron Weiner, eds
Political Parties and Political Devel(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966).
°HI!£nt..
.

,

44We use
the concept "modernization" in the economic sense
of a polity which strives to achieve a level of economic development such that a surplus of wants is readily available
and demand creation is seen as being necessary to dispose of
both wants and needs
45

LaPalombara and Weiner, see especially Chapter
the conclusion.
4 6 Ibid

.

,

p.

29.

1

and
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This situation is suggested to exist in
Franco and Italy

and to threaten the existence of

party system.
.ideological

a

continued competitive

Both of these polities exhibit fragmented

patterns and dedicated groups of militants as

party members.

A different pattern

is

demonstrated in the

United States where a dominant ideological context
exists

with two large parties comprised mainly of supporters,
few members, and a very few militants.

a

in Italy and France

the distributive controversy pits the economic class system

against the political class striving for
of citizenship.

a

broader definition

In the United States a similar class-system

versus class contest in a different ideological context
suggests that system stability is not so much a question of
the number of parties or the wealth distribution patterns
as it is the extent to which a single, or a dominant ideology
is successful as a means of legitimizing the distribution of

power, privilege and prestige.

The next step in variable

recognition would seem to be a systematic look at the class
and class system struggles from the perspective of the ideo-

logical complexion of many diverse polities.

Retrospect and Prospect

We began this essay by suggesting that the existing

general theories of political parties were inadequate and
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.restricted.

The explanation provided by Karl Marx
excludes

those parties and party systems which are
non-Marxian.

The

mandate explanation is also narrow in that Marxian
type
parties are excluded.
exclusive.

Thus both explanations are mutually

in addition,

the Marxian explanation, while of

broad or general range, is

normative construct based upon

a

an assumption of private ownership of property as being
illegal.

But Marx does not recognize that legality is a soc-

ially defined legal condition.

The mandate explanation is

of middle range generality and its supporters are ambiguous
as to its epistemological foundations.

The explanatory framework of Maurice Duverger avoids

most of the weaknesses of the mandate and Marxian explanations of parties and party systems.

It is empirically

based, is inclusive in taxonomy, and of middle range.

explanation

is,

His

however, static rather than dynamic in that

social processes are mainly ignored.

Duverger

1

s

work does

very little to assist us in answering the question,

We have suggested that

a

"Why?

possible avenue for advancement

toward an eventual general party theory is to utilize the
social forces as stated and implied by Gerhard Lenski in his
analysis of the structures and dynamics of social distribution
systems.

This approach bridges the gap between the Marxian

and mandate explanations of parties, and in addition, is not
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based upon normative assumptions.

Our framework for further

analysis is still of the middle range of
theorizing but provides avenues for variable identification and
eventually

measurement which the Duverger approach does not.

The con-

ceptualization level is analytical in that human activity
patterns, rather than persons as entities, are dealt with.

Thus our approach should further the efforts at general

political party theory generation.
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